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ARTICLES 
FOURTH AMENDMENT FIDUCIARIES 
Kiel Brennan-Marquez* 
 
Fourth Amendment law is sorely in need of reform.  To paraphrase 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones, the idea that 
people have no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared 
with third-parties—the foundation of the widely reviled “third-party 
doctrine”—makes little sense in the digital age. 
In truth, however, it is not just the third-party doctrine that needs 
retooling today.  It is the Fourth Amendment’s general approach to the 
problem of “shared information.”  Under existing law, if A shares 
information with B, A runs the risk of “misplaced trust”—the risk that B 
will disclose the information to law enforcement.  Although the misplaced 
trust rule makes sense as a default, it comes under strain in cases where A 
and B have no relationship of trust and the only reason that A shares 
information with B is to obtain a socially valuable (and practically 
indispensable) service.  In such cases, I argue that the doctrine should treat 
B as an “information fiduciary” and analyze B’s cooperation with law 
enforcement—whether voluntary or compelled—as a Fourth Amendment 
search. 
The argument develops in three parts.  Part I demonstrates that the Court 
has already identified two settings—if only implicitly—where fiduciary-style 
protections are necessary to safeguard constitutional privacy:  medical 
care and hotels.  When A is a patient and B is a doctor, and, likewise, when 
A is a guest and B is a hotel manager, the Court has been reluctant to 
apply the “misplaced trust” rule.  Rightly so:  the principle is mismatched 
to the underlying relationship.  From there, Part II fleshes out the 
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normative argument.  Put simply, we do not “trust” information fiduciaries, 
in the everyday sense, at all.  So it makes little sense—normatively, or even 
semantically—to speak of trust being “misplaced.”  Rather, the information 
is held for the benefit of the sharing party, and its use should be constrained 
by implied duties of care and loyalty.  Finally, Part III lays the groundwork 
for determining who are “Fourth Amendment fiduciaries.”  The Article 
concludes by exploring various practical metrics that courts might adopt to 
answer this question. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fourth Amendment law has long embraced the proposition that 
disclosure invites betrayal.  If A shares information with B, and B relays the 
information to the police, A can claim no constitutional harm.  Beginning 
with Katz v. United States,1 the watershed case prohibiting warrantless 
wiretaps, modern doctrine has focused on walling off private relationships 
from intrusion by law enforcement.  But the doctrine has nothing to say—
by design—about the possibility that those relationships are built on 
“misplaced trust.”2  Whatever else the Fourth Amendment protects against, 
 
 1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 2. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124–26 (1984) (finding no Fourth 
Amendment violation when a FedEx worker dismantled a customer’s package, identified 
contraband, and reported the results to law enforcement); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and 
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (“Had Mrs. Coolidge, wholly on her own initiative, sought out her 
husband’s guns and clothing and then taken them to the police station to be used as evidence 
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one thing it does not protect against is the risk of another person voluntarily 
cooperating with the authorities. 
This Article scrutinizes the “misplaced trust” rule.  In a different age—
when far less information was shared with others—this principle may have 
been sustainable in its strong form.  But it is no longer.  In today’s world, 
we constantly disclose vast amounts of information to digital 
intermediaries:  email providers, social media sites, and the like.  A rote 
application of the misplaced trust rule would leave these intermediaries 
categorically free to take up the mantle of law enforcement:  to serve as 
“Big Brother’s little helpers,”3 as long as the decision to do so is neither 
instigated nor remunerated by the state.4  This status quo is intolerable, and 
it will only become more intolerable as time goes on. 
My position is not that the misplaced trust rule should be discarded.  To 
the contrary, the rule makes sense—as a default—on both practical and 
normative grounds.  My position is that the misplaced trust rule is only a 
default, and Fourth Amendment doctrine should become more attentive to 
its exceptions.  Analytically, those exceptions are easily summarized.  The 
misplaced trust rule should not apply to information shared with 
“information fiduciaries.”5  If the nature of A and B’s relationship is such 
 
against him, there can be no doubt under existing law that the articles would later have been 
admissible in evidence.”); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (“[H]owever 
strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 
(1966) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment [does not protect] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a 
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”). 
 3. I borrow this phrase from Chris Hoofnagle. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s 
Little Helpers:  How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package 
Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004) (exploring the 
ways in which private data companies collaborate with law enforcement). 
 4. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is “wholly 
inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private 
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge 
of any governmental official”).  Lower courts, tasked with applying this standard, have 
focused on the existence of (1) compulsion, and (2) remuneration. See, e.g., Cassidy v. 
Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although a wholly private search falls outside the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted by private individuals at the instigation 
of a government officer or authority constitutes a governmental search for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 341, 344 
(4th Cir. 2003) (holding an anonymous hacker’s search for child pornography did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment—despite being a crime—because the Government did not 
“participate in,” but rather “passively accept[ed] . . . a private party’s search efforts”); United 
States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a technician’s discovery of 
files on defendant’s computer, “made pursuant to . . . maintenance work” that “[t]he 
Government had no knowledge” of and “did not instruct” the technician to perform, is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment; also noting that one consideration in determining 
whether a search was private is “whether the Government offered the private party a 
reward”). 
 5. See Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5, 
2014, 4:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age. 
html [http://perma.cc/VN5D-JBZP]; see also Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an 
Election Without Anyone Ever Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), http://www. 
newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerry 
mandering (exploring, among other things, the idea that Facebook is an information 
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that B is obligated to prioritize A’s interests over her own, B should not be 
free to betray information shared by A.  In those circumstances, the Fourth 
Amendment should not only constrain the way law enforcement officials 
gather information, but it should also constrain the way that private 
actors—information fiduciaries—transmit it.6 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I is exegetical.  
Notwithstanding the absolute language that judges use—and commentators 
echo—when describing the misplaced trust rule, in fact there are two 
settings in which the Court’s jurisprudence has already been sensitive to the 
need for heightened protection due to the types of relationships involved:  
medical care and hotels.  When A is a patient and B is a doctor, and 
likewise, when A is a guest and B is a hotel manager, the Court has been 
reluctant to apply the misplaced trust rule.  And rightly so:  in both settings, 
it seemed apparent to the Court—even if existing doctrine offered no 
vocabulary to say so explicitly—that the rule would disserve, and perhaps 
disintegrate, the underlying relationship. 
Equipped with these examples, Part II turns to normative analysis.  
Although there has been no shortage of commentary in recent years about 
the need to retool Fourth Amendment law for the digital age, the misplaced 
trust rule survives unscathed.  Instead, the reform effort has focused 
primarily on Smith v. Maryland7 and United States v. Miller8—progenitors 
of the so-called “third-party doctrine”—which hold that we have no 
expectation of privacy in the dialed numbers we share with phone 
companies9 or in the financial information we share with banks.10  In the 
shadow of Smith and Miller, scholars (and dissident judges) have been 
scrambling to explain why digital communication enjoys any Fourth 
Amendment protection, even from intrusion by law enforcement.11  The 
 
fiduciary) [http://perma.cc/TR9M-R29X].  These efforts have much in common, 
conceptually, with work that Neil Richards has done, along with Dan Solove and Woody 
Hartzog, on the normative relationship between privacy, confidentiality, and trust. See Neil 
M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:  Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007); Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking 
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law (Aug. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2655719 [http://perma.cc/Z8VD-Y9W2]. 
 6. Although reform efforts have not been entirely insensitive to this issue, they have 
tended to focus (for obvious reasons, given the doctrinal pedigree) on the law enforcement 
side of the equation. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS 99–111 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] 
(outlining the criteria that law enforcement should be required to satisfy before seizing 
records from institutional third parties).  Although this is certainly a step in the right 
direction, in my view a full account of constitutional privacy today must also interrogate the 
other side of the equation:  To what extent should third parties be able to cooperate with law 
enforcement? 
 7. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 8. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 9. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736. 
 10. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436. 
 11. On the judicial front, see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that in “the digital age,” it may be “necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 
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results have been mixed. Although the effort to marginalize Smith and 
Miller certainly improves on the status quo, it also leaves unresolved—
indeed, unexamined—the distinct privacy concerns that arise when 
intermediaries decide to aid the authorities voluntarily.  Many of the 
practices that rightfully alarm scholars today—for example, the collection 
of bulk metadata—would still be alarming (perhaps even more so) if they 
were spearheaded by private actors, not at the behest of law enforcement, 
but with the purpose of assisting law enforcement.  In today’s world, that 
possibility is no dormant hypothetical.  It is an increasingly prevalent state 
of affairs.12 
In short, although existing commentary has focused—understandably—
on the pitfalls of the third-party doctrine, the problem actually looms 
considerably larger.  Smith and Miller stand for the proposition that when 
information is shared between parties with no preexisting trust relationship, 
the act of sharing carries no expectation of privacy.  Many commentators 
have lodged their disagreement with this proposition.  There is an important 
sense, however, in which the proposition is not just wrong; it is backward.  
When information is shared between parties with no preexisting trust 
relationship, it makes little sense to speak of trust being misplaced, because 
trust was not “placed” at all.  The act of sharing therefore should carry even 
more protection than the misplaced trust rule would afford.  In this sense, 
the abrogation of Smith and Miller—though certainly a welcome 
possibility—would not go far enough.  To refurbish Fourth Amendment law 
for the digital age, it is not merely the third-party doctrine, but also the 
misplaced trust rule, that needs rethinking. 
 
32 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing the surveillance ushered in by section 215 of the PATRIOT 
ACT as “so different from [the] simple pen register [in] Smith” and holding that “bulk 
telephony metadata collection and analysis [violates] a reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
But see ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated on other 
grounds, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding, under Smith, that individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata).  On the scholarly front, see Laura 
Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:  Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 865–71 (2014) (arguing that on the facts of Smith, reasonable 
suspicion—at the very least—was essentially established, setting the case entirely apart from 
applications today that extend its holding to bulk, suspicionless surveillance); Stephen E. 
Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment:  Protecting Third-Party Information, 
Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2007); Stephen E. 
Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. BULL. 39, 40 (2011) [hereinafter Henderson, Timely Demise] (describing the doctrine 
as, among other things, “fundamentally misguided”); Neil M. Richards, The Information 
Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1117–19 (2006); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of 
Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 109–15 (2008); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the 
Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 
614, 619–21 (2011) (suggesting that technological change has rendered the third-party 
doctrine untenable).  Although some of these critiques preexisted the digital age, 
technological change has only intensified their force. See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Automation 
and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 585 (2011) (noting that although “Smith 
and the Third-Party Doctrine were heavily criticized even before the Internet age, the 
drumbeat of criticism has [only] intensified”); id. at 585 n.26 (compiling further sources). 
See generally Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search?:  Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002). 
 12. See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
616 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Against this backdrop, I propose a simple remedy:  Fourth Amendment 
doctrine must abandon the pretense that all private actors are alike.  The 
implication of A’s decision to share information with B should not be 
uniform across contexts.  Rather, it should depend on what type of “third 
party” B is, on B’s role in the world vis-à-vis A.  In many settings, it is 
perfectly acceptable—indeed, it serves an important public function—for B 
to help investigate A’s illicit activity.  But there is also an important class of 
cases in which B is not a run-of-the-mill private actor, but rather an 
information fiduciary, beholden to A’s interests first and foremost. 
I.  THE DOCTRINAL STORY 
When it comes to shared information, the familiar story is that Fourth 
Amendment doctrine toggles between two rules.  First, some acts of 
disclosure simply extinguish one’s expectation of privacy outright.  I call 
this the “exposure” rule.  If information has been exposed to the world, its 
investigation does not qualify, in the first instance, as a search, so the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply.  Second, other acts of disclosure, 
although they do not eliminate one’s expectation of privacy, do cause one to 
run the risk that another party—the counterparty to the disclosure—will 
betray the information to law enforcement.  I refer to the latter as the 
“misplaced trust” rule.13 
 
Rule 
By disclosing 
information to B, has 
A lost his expectation 
of privacy? 
 
By disclosing 
information to B, has 
A run the risk that B 
will relay the 
information to law 
enforcement? 
 
Exposure 
(no protection) Yes Yes 
Misplaced Trust 
(default) No Yes 
 
 
 13. There is one set of cases that is not easily explained by this scheme—cases in which 
the Court holds that no expectation of privacy exists in the specific type of evidence being 
searched for, even if the evidence has not been, in the usual sense, “exposed.”  The two 
examples that come to mind are dog sniffs and sting operations designed to uncover illicit 
activity in the home. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (explaining 
that dog sniffs are “sui generis,” insofar as they precisely target contraband); Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“[W]hen, as here, the home is converted into a commercial 
center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that 
business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, 
or on the street.”).  Because these cases are difficult to rationalize under any theory of 
privacy, I do not take it as a particularly bad sign that they clash with the scheme set forth 
here. 
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But the familiar story is incomplete.  In fact, there is a third Fourth 
Amendment rule—a heightened tier of protection.  Some acts of disclosure 
neither extinguish one’s expectation of privacy in the shared information 
nor cause one to run the risk of a counterparty betraying the information to 
law enforcement.  I refer to this as the “fiduciary” rule. 
 
Rule 
By disclosing 
information to B, has 
A lost his expectation 
of privacy? 
 
By disclosing 
information to B, has 
A run the risk that B 
will relay the 
information to law 
enforcement? 
 
Exposure 
(no protection) Yes Yes 
Misplaced Trust 
(default) No Yes 
Fiduciary 
(more protective) No No 
 
To date, the fiduciary rule has surfaced in the Court’s jurisprudence in 
two settings:  medical care and hotels.  In both settings, the same impetus is 
discernible—the misplaced trust rule seemed mismatched to the underlying 
relationship.  It seemed wrong to the Court—for good reason—that 
constitutional privacy would be left to the mercy of doctors and hotel staff.  
The rest of this part explores each rule, and their interrelationship, at greater 
length. 
A.  Exposure 
Exposure cases typically focus on the vantage point from which 
information can be ascertained.  As the Court explained in the seminal case 
of Katz v. United States,14 “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”15  This principle, repeated tirelessly since Katz,16 supplies an 
intuitive anchor for Fourth Amendment doctrine.  At root, the principle 
depends on the uncontroversial premise that information disclosed to the 
whole world carries no expectation of privacy—from which it follows that 
the act of viewing and recording such information does not qualify as a 
search.17 
 
 14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 15. Id. at 351. 
 16. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
 17. Sherry Colb has traced the contours of this logic (and its shortcomings) with 
precision. See generally Colb, supra note 11. 
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The key question, of course, is what counts as exposing something “to 
the public.”  In response, the Court has offered an elaborate, if sometimes 
unconvincing, parade of answers.  To begin with, something is exposed to 
the public if it is viewable from a public place.18  Suppose Mary runs 
frantically through the town square, yelling about the details of a murder 
she recently committed.  If a police officer, overhearing Mary, acts on the 
information (decides to follow Mary, to arrest Mary, and so on), plainly no 
search has occurred.  The Fourth Amendment does not constrain the 
officer’s ability to listen, from a public vantage point, to Mary’s ravings.  
The same reasoning applies, moreover, if Mary is raving inside her home, 
but loudly enough that she can be heard from the sidewalk;19 likewise, if 
Mary posts the ravings to her Facebook page (assuming it is a public 
page);20 or if she transcribes the ravings in a notebook and then discards the 
notebook in a trash heap by the side of the road.21 
What is true of a confession is also true of material evidence.  Joe struts 
through the town square with a kilo of cocaine under his arm, and a police 
officer, viewing the drugs, arrests him.  Clearly, no search has occurred.  
Nor would it have been a search for the police officer to watch Joe, in 
public, for many hours before Joe came into possession of the cocaine.  
Indeed, it doesn’t matter how long the public surveillance of Joe had been 
ongoing; absent certain kinds of technological enhancement, the 
surveillance would never amount to a search.22  Similarly, if Joe puts a kilo 
of cocaine on his coffee table and the table is viewable from the street, Joe 
cannot complain if police officers look through his window, see the drugs, 
and arrest him.  Likewise, if Joe lives on a grand estate and the police enter 
the grounds—against Joe’s wishes—and observe a kilo of cocaine on Joe’s 
living room table while standing in the “fields” surrounding his home, no 
search has occurred.23  Nor can Joe complain if he puts the kilo of cocaine 
in his backyard and the police identify it via aerial surveillance.24 
 
 18. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001) (explaining that 
“ordinary visual surveillance of a home”—from a public vantage point—is not a Fourth 
Amendment search). 
 19. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013) (“[L]aw enforcement officers 
need not ‘shield their eyes’ when passing by the home ‘on public thoroughfares.’” (quoting 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213)). 
 20. See, e.g., Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 
2013) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in material posted to a social networking 
website); United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same).  For an 
excellent summary of the intersection of Fourth Amendment doctrine and social media, see 
Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227 
(2012). 
 21. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1986). 
 22. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (explaining that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that 
the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely 
unaffected by the advance of technology,” and holding that doctrine must evolve to reflect 
this reality).  Something like this is rather obviously at stake in the Court’s recent holdings 
regarding GPS and smart phones. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 23. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170 (1984). 
 24. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207. 
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The same logic applies to the tracking of movements through public 
space—a mainstay of everyday law enforcement.  Suppose the police 
suspect Bill of drug trafficking, so they watch Bill’s movements to and 
from work every day, noting his stops.  After a few weeks, the police patch 
together a pattern of Bill stopping at a known drug den after work, and on 
that basis, they secure a warrant to search his apartment.  Bill would have 
no grounds to complain about such surveillance; he has no expectation of 
privacy in his public movements.  Nor would Bill have any grounds to 
complain about the police tailing his movements by car, even if they do so 
by getting Bill to unwittingly equip his car with a tracking device.25  To 
whatever extent technological enhancement would change these 
outcomes—a doctrinal question currently in flux, being negotiated against 
the backdrop of United States v. Jones26—it is clear that in the absence of 
technological enhancement, no Fourth Amendment claim would lie. 
Some of these holdings may seem like unsound applications of the 
“exposure” principle.  Who, after all, would think that activity carried out in 
a private backyard, shielded from neighbors by a tall fence, is exposed to 
the whole world simply because someone could, in theory, view it from the 
sky?  And who would think the police, having entered private property in 
clear disregard of a “no trespassing” sign, have free reign to snoop around, 
as long as they stay sufficiently far away from the physical perimeter of 
one’s home?  The important point, however, is that even putting the virtues 
of these holdings to one side, their analytic underpinning is clear.  The 
Court’s logic focuses on whether the relevant information has been 
“exposed” to the world.  When the answer is yes, no Fourth Amendment 
protection applies because the observational act does not amount, in the 
first instance, to a search. 
Before moving on, there is a final pair of cases that qualify—rhetorically, 
at least—as applications of the exposure rule:  Smith and Miller, which hold 
that sharing a dialed number with a phone company or sharing financial 
information with a bank eliminates one’s expectation of privacy in the 
relevant information.27  To reach this result, Smith and Miller conflate the 
act of disclosing information with the act of exposing information to public 
view, a conceptual jump that scholars and sitting judges have long 
maligned.28  This is understandable—in the pantheon of modern Fourth 
 
 25. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276 (1983). 
 26. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 27. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (sharing a dialed number); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976) (sharing financial information); see also United 
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980) (interpreting Miller to preclude defendant from 
challenging the search of his accountant’s papers, on the grounds that, inter alia, the search 
yielded only financial information). 
 28. In addition to criticizing the Court’s conflation of disclosure and exposure as a 
normative proposition, various commentators have also noted that, in practice, the Court has 
not had the courage of its own conviction.  Like many extreme principles, the third-party 
doctrine would lead to some very uncomfortable results if extended to its logical limit.  
Instead of biting the bullet, the Court has continually found ways around applying the third-
party doctrine in its strong form. See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. 
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Amendment law, Smith and Miller are the only times the Court has 
understood the disclosure of information to a specific counterparty as 
equivalent to broadcasting the information to the whole world.29 
B.  Misplaced Trust 
This brings us to the second rule.  Notwithstanding the Court’s rather 
zealous language from Smith and Miller, it simply is not the case that 
“individual[s] ha[ve] no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”30  In fact, the default rule—famously 
enshrined in Katz, when the Court banned warrantless wiretapping—is just 
the opposite.  Normally, when A shares information with B, A does retain 
her expectation of privacy in the information.31  But A also runs the risk that 
B, now in possession of the information, will betray it to law enforcement.  
This is the sense in which, as the Court is fond of repeating, the Fourth 
Amendment is not a bulwark against misplaced trust; it provides no remedy 
 
Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 438 
(2013) (arguing that, in the last twenty-five years, “there have certainly been cases which 
some of the Justices believed to be governed by the [third-party] doctrine,” but “the doctrine 
has not fared well”); id. at 438–43 (exploring how the Court has departed from the third-
party doctrine in no fewer than five prominent cases); cf. Strandburg, supra note 11, at 633–
38 (arguing that, notwithstanding the sweeping language of Smith and Miller, the 
“aggressive” form of the third-party doctrine has almost never been faithfully applied). 
 29. This claim requires two caveats.  First, the Supreme Court has held that some Fourth 
Amendment challenges are stillborn for want of “standing,” because the police did not 
search the defendant’s property; rather, the police searched another person’s property, and 
that search ended up yielding evidence incriminating the defendant. See, e.g., Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980) (holding that defendant lacked standing to challenge 
the search of a third-party’s handbag).  One could read these “Fourth Amendment standing” 
cases as standing for the proposition that transmitting certain types of material evidence to a 
third-party—for example, as in Rawlings, a bag of drugs for storage in a third-party’s 
purse—is equivalent to exposing evidence to the whole world.  But even so, the Fourth 
Amendment standing cases apply only to material evidence, not shared information. See 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (stating that passengers lacked standing to challenge 
the search of a car when they had no possessory interest in either the car or the evidence 
seized from the car); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (finding defendant lacked 
standing to challenge the search of a home where he was working as a drug packager).  
Second, some lower courts have picked up where the Supreme Court left off in Smith and 
Miller and extended the reach of the third-party doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. 
Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 361 (D. Vt. 2013) (holding that cell phone users have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site location data).  However, Smith and Miller (and 
Payner, insofar as it echoes Miller) are the only times the Supreme Court has spoken on the 
issue. 
 30. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (summarizing the received view 
of Smith and Miller); see Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (“This Court consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”). 
 31. Traditionally, the wedge dividing Smith from Katz—or, one could say, keeping 
Smith quarantined—is the distinction between “content” and “noncontent” information.  The 
pitfalls of this distinction, particularly in an age of sophisticated data analytics, are well 
known. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.  Similarly well known is Orin Kerr’s 
defense of the distinction on technological neutrality grounds. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for 
the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 581 (2009). 
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for “a wrongdoer’s [mistaken] belief that a person to whom he voluntarily 
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”32 
Mail correspondence is the paradigm case.  In one of its earliest Fourth 
Amendment holdings, Ex Parte Jackson,33 the Court canonically held that 
the government may not engage in suspicionless searches of private letters 
because “[l]etters and sealed packages . . . are as fully guarded from 
examination and inspection” when sent through the postal service “as if 
they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own 
domiciles.”34  In some sense, Katz and its progeny are, at their core, little 
more than an affirmative extrapolation of the principle in Ex Parte Jackson. 
The essence of Katz (and Ex Parte Jackson) is twofold.  First, one’s 
expectation of privacy in the contents of a phone call—or, equally, a letter 
or an email—survive disclosure.  Otherwise, corresponding with another 
person would amount to an ipso facto waiver of all restraints on law 
enforcement surveillance of private communication.  At the same time, 
however, corresponding with another person does expose one to the risk of 
betrayal.  No one would construe Ex Parte Jackson—and as far as I know, 
no one has construed Ex Parte Jackson—to limit the ability of a letter’s 
recipient to forward its contents to law enforcement, just as no one 
construes Katz to limit the ability of the person on the other line from 
recording the call or consenting to a wiretap.35 
Framing the issue this way underscores the analytic harmony between 
Katz and the confidential informant (CI) cases, which hold that A, by 
sharing information with B, runs the risk that B is an undercover police 
agent.36  Although Katz is often described as the “lodestar” of Fourth 
Amendment protection37 while the CI cases are described as the opposite,38 
a common premise unites them.  Namely, by disclosing something to B, A 
puts herself at B’s mercy, exposed to the danger that B may prove to be a 
“false friend.”39  Even for commentators that decry the CI cases as wrongly 
decided—and there are plenty40—this premise is not in dispute.  For critics, 
 
 32. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
 33. 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
 34. Id. at 733. 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 726 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“[T]wo people who speak face to face in a private place or on a private telephone line both 
may share an expectation that the conversation will remain private, but either may give 
effective consent to a wiretap or other electronic surveillance.  One might say that the 
telephone line, or simply the space that separates two persons in conversation, is their jointly 
owned ‘container.’  Each has standing to challenge the use as evidence of the fruits of an 
unauthorized search of that ‘container,’ but either may also give effective consent to the 
search.” (citations omitted)). 
 36. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293; Lewis v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
 37. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). 
 38. See supra note 11. 
 39. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”:  Expectations of 
Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253 (2006). 
 40. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 103–06 (1991); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake:  Toward 
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the point is simply that the danger of B turning out to be a “false friend” 
does not entail the danger that B already is a “false friend.”41  But 
controversy about the second proposition in no way disturbs the first.  
Among scholars who would do away with the CI cases, none would do 
away with “false friend” logic as such—which makes sense because, at 
some level, the “false friend” logic simply restates the misplaced trust rule. 
Finally, the misplaced trust rule also applies to spaces, including 
homes.42  By inviting someone into my home, I don’t lose my expectation 
of privacy; I still have the right to exclude law enforcement from entry 
(absent a warrant or probable cause).  But I do run the risk that an invited 
guest—or, likewise, a roommate, spouse, or family member—will open my 
home to law enforcement.  This is true in two senses.  First, I run the risk 
that another person will locate incriminating evidence in my home, 
physically remove it, and pass it on to the police.43  Suppose Laura’s 
boyfriend finds cocaine under their mattress and takes it to the local 
precinct, leading to her arrest.  On these facts, Laura has no constitutional 
recourse.44  The second sense in which the misplaced trust rule applies to 
homes is that if A and B cohabitate, A runs the risk of B consenting to 
search by law enforcement (and vice versa).  In United States v. Matlock,45 
the Court established, in no uncertain terms, that one cotenant may consent 
to a search on behalf of all cotenants, even if there is evidence that another 
 
an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 728 
(1985). 
 41. In this sense, to bear their conceptual burden, critics of the CI cases must distinguish 
between (1) B receiving information from A, and then deciding to tell law enforcement, and 
(2) B deciding, in the first instance, that she wishes to incriminate A and then eliciting 
information from A with the goal of assisting law enforcement.  Although this distinction is 
certainly conceivable, it also gives rise to a rather serious line-drawing problem.  In practice, 
there are many sympathetic cases—cases where I suspect most people would want B to 
remain free to assist the police without constitutional hindrance—where B will make up her 
mind to betray A before soliciting the incriminating information or material evidence.  For 
example, what if A is B’s abusive spouse, and B, fearing for her own safety, decides to build 
a case against A?  To be persuasive, criticism of the CI cases must distinguish a hypothetical 
like this from the use of police informants—a taller order than it might first appear. 
 42. That being said, the application of the misplaced trust rule to spaces is not limited to 
homes.  Given the hallowed status of the home in Fourth Amendment law, however, other 
examples follow, as a normative matter, essentially a fortiori. See, e.g., O’Conner v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (holding that employees have an expectation of privacy in their 
offices, but that “in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and 
other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related 
visits,” which carries certain risks). 
 43. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487–89 (1971) (holding that it was a 
private search—outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment—when a woman retrieved 
incriminating evidence about her husband from their home and gave the evidence to the 
police); see also United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 525–27 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
it was a purely private search when defendant’s roommate and her boyfriend entered 
defendant’s room, removed a photo album, and gave it to the police). 
 44. Indeed, if Laura peruses the case law, she may be chastened to learn that courts 
express sympathy not for the party in her position, but for the party in her boyfriend’s 
position—the innocent figure who brings wrongdoing to light. See Bowers, 594 F.3d at 525–
27. 
 45. 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
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cotenant, absent when the police arrived on the scene, would have objected 
to the search.46  Later cases have affirmed this principle numerous times 
over.47 
C.  Expanding the Horizon of Protection 
And so the traditional story ends, with the idea that another private 
actor’s decision to cooperate with law enforcement is, across contexts, the 
outer bound of constitutional protection and that no matter how robustly the 
Fourth Amendment might protect us from police activity, it protects us not 
at all from the activity of private persons.  Taking the Court’s words at face 
value, one could be forgiven for seeing this idea as an irreducible axiom of 
Fourth Amendment law.  The reality is more complicated.  The misplaced 
trust rule certainly operates as a constitutional default.  But ultimately, it is 
only that.  Like any default rule, it comes under strain in exceptional cases.  
The question is what makes the exceptional cases exceptional.  I believe the 
answer centers on relationships. 
1.  Doctors 
In 1988, doctors at a public hospital in Charleston, South Carolina, 
instituted a program to screen the urine of pregnant women for drug use 
and, if drug use was found, to transmit the incriminating samples to law 
enforcement.48  One of the women subject to this program was Crystal 
Ferguson.  Along with a group of other similarly situated plaintiffs, she 
brought a constitutional challenge on the grounds that the collection and 
testing of the patients’ urine violated their Fourth Amendment rights.49  The 
Court held, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,50 that it did because (1) the 
hospital’s program involved suspicionless searches, and (2) unlike other 
drug testing cases—where the Court had permitted suspicionless searches 
because of the “special needs” they serve—law enforcement was the 
 
 46. See id. at 169–72. 
 47. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186–87 (1990) (extending Matlock to 
situations where third party is not actually a cotenant and only has apparent shared authority 
over the residence). Compare Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114–23 (2006) (holding 
that if both cotenants are present, and one invokes his Fourth Amendment rights, that 
invocation trumps the other’s consent), with Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 
(2014) (holding that the consent of cotenant sufficed to justify the search after the other 
tenant (1) had invoked his Randolph rights, but (2) had been removed from the premises).  
Furthermore, the same logic also works in reverse, as applied to guests themselves, rather 
than people who invite guests into their homes.  Just as A does not lose all expectation of 
privacy in his home by inviting B over, so, too, B does not lose all expectation of privacy by 
taking A’s invitation.  Rather, both parties, A and B, risk “betrayal” (i.e., consent to search by 
law enforcement or exposure of contraband) by the other. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 
U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990). 
 48. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001). 
 49. See id. at 72–73. 
 50. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
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ultimate purpose.51  Thus, the program did not withstand Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny.52 
I regard Ferguson as unassailably correct.  The interesting question is 
why.  The opinion for the Court sweeps past—but, curiously enough, never 
fully answers—the threshold question in the case:  Given the misplaced 
trust rule, why does the Fourth Amendment even come into play?  What 
aspect of the doctors’ decision to betray their patients’ trust amounts to a 
law enforcement “search”?  The only explanation offered in Justice 
Stevens’s opinion is that “[b]ecause [the South Carolina hospital] is a state 
hospital, the members of its staff are government actors, subject to the 
strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”53  And this explanation has some 
glancing appeal.  After all, the Fourth Amendment certainly embeds some 
version of the state action requirement; as a general matter, “private 
searches” meet with no constitutional scrutiny, even if the very same 
activity, carried out by law enforcement, would undeniably constitute a 
search.54 
But the majority’s “state hospital” rationale suffers a fundamental defect.  
Government actors are only “subject to the strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment,” in the way the majority suggests, to the extent their actions 
are coercive, either because the search in question is compelled by law or 
because failure to submit to the search incurs legal consequences.  This is 
true of all the special needs cases invoked by Justice Stevens to support the 
“state hospital” rationale.55  For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n,56 train conductors brought a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to a federal statute requiring drug testing for railway employees.57  
It was undisputed (and indisputable) that the testing constituted a search;58 
it was mandatory,59 and it was plainly an invasion of privacy.  The question 
 
 51. Id. at 84. 
 52. Id. at 84–85. 
 53. Id. at 76. 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (declaring that the 
Fourth Amendment is “wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable 
one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the 
participation or knowledge of any governmental official’” (quoting Walter v. United States, 
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))). 
 55. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76; see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309–10 (1997) 
(urine test required as a condition of running for public office); Verona Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648–49 (1995) (student urine testing required by school district); Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 659–63 (1989) (urine testing as a 
condition of employment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335–37 (1985) (search of 
student’s effects required by schools officials). 
 56. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).  For background on the way the Court reasons through 
mandatory urine testing—and other mandatory “special needs” searches—see Chandler, 520 
U.S. 305. 
 57. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612. 
 58. See id. at 618. 
 59. This is true even in the case of the noncompulsory drug testing, which the Court held 
to be a constructive law enforcement search. Id. at 615–16.  Although Skinner concerned 
both mandatory and “optional” drug testing on the part of private companies, the Court 
explicitly rejected the proposition that the searches were not instigated by the government. 
Id. at 614–15.  In other words, it saw the testing as coerced by the state de facto rather than 
2015] FOURTH AMENDMENT FIDUCIARIES 625 
before the Court was whether the “special need” of public safety—in light 
of the heightened danger that arises from having railway conductors 
operating trains under the influence of drugs—justified the invasion of 
privacy.60  (And the answer was yes.61) 
In Ferguson, by contrast, the initial act of disclosure—from patient to 
doctor—was not mandatory.62  To be sure, because the disclosure was 
motivated by a desire for medical care, it would be difficult to call the act 
purely voluntary.  The patients needed prenatal care, and to obtain it, urine 
testing was necessary.  What were the patients to do?  Presumably none of 
them anticipated (or desired) the transmission of incriminating medical 
evidence to law enforcement.63  But the fact remains that no law required 
the patients to entrust urine to their doctors.  They chose to do so—and their 
trust ended up being misplaced.  Under existing doctrine, that should be the 
end of the matter. 
To be clear, I regard this result as an argument against the misplaced 
trust rule—hence the motivation for this Article.  But there can be little 
doubt that on a faithful application of the rule, a patient’s decision to give 
her doctor a urine sample should end the inquiry.  The doctor should be 
free—as any party is free—to transmit incriminating evidence to law 
enforcement.64  A patient no more can object, on Fourth Amendment 
grounds, to a doctor furnishing law enforcement with a urine sample than I 
can object to my sister furnishing law enforcement with information about a 
crime I committed, in the event that I (mistakenly) confess the details to 
her.  For purposes of the misplaced trust rule, what matters is not whether 
the entrusted party is a state actor or a private actor; what matters is that 
 
de jure—but the subtleties of this distinction are beside the point, because in Ferguson, the 
testing was not coerced by the state in either sense.  If it was coerced, it was so by the 
doctors, which might be said, of course, to underscore a problem with the private search 
doctrine.  But it does not make Ferguson and Skinner analogous. 
 60. Id. at 618–20. 
 61. Id. at 621. 
 62. As it turns out, even if the initial disclosure was not voluntary—as the Fourth Circuit 
concluded on remand—this still cannot rescue the majority’s logic. See Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 402–03 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining the difficulties associated with 
treating disclosures to doctors as “voluntary”).  What makes it a search is its practical 
involuntariness—an idea I explore in Part II below—not the fact that the counterparty to the 
(practically involuntary) transmission was a public actor.  Put otherwise, it would be just as 
practically involuntary, and therefore just as much a search, if the doctors were private 
doctors. 
 63. In this respect, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion on remand confirms what common sense 
makes inescapable:  the patients were not consenting to a law enforcement search when they 
turned over their urine for medical purposes. See id. 
 64. To be clear, I mean that doctors “should be free” to transmit incriminating evidence 
to law enforcement under the logic of the private search rule, not that doctors ought to be 
free, in a normative sense, to transmit incriminating evidence to law enforcement.  In fact, in 
many jurisdictions doctors have obligations of confidentiality that strictly limit what they can 
do with patient information. See, e.g., Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722, 
725–28 (Tenn. 2006) (explaining doctors’ confidentiality obligations under Tennessee law 
and canvassing other jurisdictions with equivalent rules).  This is rightly so:  expectations of 
confidence are what facilitate candid interaction with doctors and, ultimately, what allow for 
optimal medical care. 
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information has been entrusted voluntarily.  Once voluntary entrustment 
occurs, the entrusting party (here, the patient) runs the risk of betrayal by 
the entrusted party (here, the doctor)—whether or not the entrusted party is 
a state actor. 
An example will shore up the point.  Suppose a drug dealer is waiting in 
line at the DMV with a paper bag full of illicit pills in his coat pocket.  
After receiving a call from a customer who lives across the street, the drug 
dealer gets an idea.  He thinks:  I bet I could run across the street and make 
this delivery before my number is called.  Then the drug dealer gets another 
idea:  he will only take a few pills across the street, in case the deal is a 
setup.  So he reaches into the bag, puts some pills in his pocket, and asks 
the person sitting next to him—another private citizen, for all he knows—to 
watch the paper bag for him.  The neighbor agrees, and the drug dealer goes 
across the street to make his delivery. 
In this example, if the neighbor becomes suspicious and rustles through 
the bag to discover the pills, there is no dispute that he could turn the pills 
over to law enforcement (and provide testimony about the incident) without 
violating—indeed, without even triggering—the drug dealer’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.  By leaving the bag with his neighbor, not only has the 
drug dealer run the risk that the neighbor will become curious and decide to 
betray his trust, but, under Hoffa v. United States65 and United States v. 
White,66 he has also run the risk that the neighbor is already working as an 
informant.  Indeed, he has even run the risk that (unbeknownst to the drug 
dealer) the police have orchestrated the entire scene to catch him red-
handed when he hands over the bag.  All of this would fall clearly within 
the bounds of Fourth Amendment law. 
But now adjust the hypothetical slightly:  instead of giving the bag to his 
neighbor, the drug dealer goes up to the DMV counter and asks a clerk to 
hold on to the bag.  The clerk agrees.  Does this version of the hypothetical 
yield a different result because the DMV clerk, unlike the neighbor, is a 
state actor?  Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the clerk from helping 
law enforcement in a manner that it does not prohibit the neighbor from 
doing so?  Or, asked the other way around, has the drug dealer run any less 
risk of misplaced trust simply because the clerk happens to work for the 
state?  Hewing to its own logic, the Ferguson majority would have to 
answer all these questions “yes.”  But that seems amiss.  Under existing 
doctrine, the important variable is the fact of entrustment, not the identity of 
the entrusted party.  If entrustment occurred, the Fourth Amendment has 
nothing to say when it proves ill-advised, whether or not the entrusted party 
is a state actor.67 
 
 65. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 66. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 67. It may be that if the entrusted party happens to be a police officer, the analysis would 
proceed differently.  Query:  If a drug dealer walks into a police station and leaves a bag of 
drugs in the care of the supervising officer, does the Fourth Amendment constrain the 
officer’s ability to open the bag?  Perhaps.  But even so, what is at stake is not the public-
private divide as such; it is the distinction between law enforcement and all other actors, 
public or private.  The reasoning in Ferguson still falters. 
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Ultimately, then, the rationale offered by the Ferguson majority to justify 
subjecting the urine screening program to constitutional scrutiny—that the 
conduct occurred “[at] a state hospital”68—cannot shoulder its doctrinal 
burden.  Why, given the misplaced trust rule, should the transmission of 
incriminating evidence from doctors to law enforcement qualify as a search 
at all, regardless of the “special need” behind it?  The opinion for the Court 
begs this question in lieu of resolving it,69 which is no doubt why Justice 
Scalia, dissenting in Ferguson, expressed such virulent dismay with Justice 
Stevens and the majority.  In Justice Scalia’s words: 
Until today, we have never held—or even suggested—that material which 
a person voluntarily entrusts to someone else cannot be given by that 
person to the police, and used for whatever evidence it may contain.  
Without so much as discussing the point, the Court today opens a hole in 
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.70 
Justice Scalia is right.71  Normally, once A shares incriminating evidence 
with B, A can raise no objection if B decides to share the evidence with law 
enforcement.72  Ferguson departs from this principle.  And in doing so, it 
 
 68. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001). 
 69. Not surprisingly, this has been replicated in lower court applications of Ferguson. 
See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We thus read . . . Ferguson 
to call for the application of the special-needs test in cases involving suspicionless 
searches . . . .” (emphasis added)); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“Ferguson . . . struck down suspicionless searches because they vindicated no special need 
distinguishable from general law enforcement.”).  Indeed, I was able to locate only one 
dissent in one case—combing through all of the federal appellate jurisprudence—that 
indicates an appreciation for Ferguson’s more radical implications. See Kerns v. Bader, 663 
F.3d 1173, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting) (arguing that Ferguson not 
only vindicates patients’ expectations of privacy in personal medical evidence but also 
reaffirms the “long ago established” proposition that “the police cannot breach one’s 
constitutional rights simply by asking another person to do it for them”—that doctors may 
not furnish the police with material that the police, absent probable cause, couldn’t seize on 
their own). 
 70. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 71. Well, to be picky about it, Scalia’s use of the word “never,” though technically true, 
is a bit misleading.  He is right that no other Supreme Court case supports the proposition 
that material evidence voluntarily given to a third party cannot be shared subsequently with 
law enforcement.  But zoom out one click—make the point about incriminating evidence in 
general, not material evidence in particular—and the hotel cases discussed below are similar 
to Ferguson. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 72. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 749 (1971) (“[H]owever strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his 
expectations in this respect are not protected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out 
that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities.”); 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment [does not 
protect] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his 
wrongdoing will not reveal it.”).  As Justice Scalia (correctly) notes, “The Hoffa line of 
cases . . . does not distinguish between operations meant to catch a criminal in the act, and 
those meant only to gather evidence of prior wrongdoing,” as was the case in Ferguson, 532 
U.S. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For a deft elaboration of this point, see Colb, supra note 
11, at 182 (validating Scalia’s analytic point the same way I am validating it here—by noting 
the sense in which Ferguson departs from the premise that “police collection of what has 
been surrendered to a third party . . . is not a Fourth Amendment search”); id. at 181–84 
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runs contrary to what is often described, in other cases, as an immutable 
first principle of Fourth Amendment law.73 
Much as I agree, however, with Justice Scalia’s analytic point, I cannot 
sign on to his conclusion that no search occurred.  The normative intuition 
underlying the majority opinion in Ferguson seems to me undeniably 
right—so right, in fact, that it verges on self-evident, which may help to 
explain why Justice Stevens felt no compulsion to fully defend his 
rationale.  Doctors should not be allowed to betray the trust of their patients.  
Full stop.  Which is to say, something about the nature of the relationship 
between doctors and patients creates an exception to the misplaced trust 
rule.  Under normal circumstances, if A shares evidence with B, B is free to 
relay the evidence to law enforcement.  But if B is a doctor, the misplaced 
trust rule no longer applies. 
Because the Ferguson majority was able to wave off this problem by 
invoking the public status of the hospital, it made no effort to reconcile its 
holding with other instantiations of the misplaced trust rule.  The CI cases 
make one, and only one, appearance in Ferguson—in Justice Scalia’s 
dissent.74  But make no mistake:  Ferguson runs directly into this line of 
cases.75  At some level, in fact, it runs into Katz itself.  For if the logic of 
 
(exploring the radical effect that Ferguson’s logic, extended to its limits, has for Fourth 
Amendment privacy). 
 73. Although the majority tries to parry this argument, its reasoning withers under 
scrutiny.  According to the majority, 
The dissent . . . mischaracterizes our opinion as holding that “material which a 
person voluntarily entrusts to someone else cannot be given by that person to the 
police, and used for whatever evidence it may contain.”  But, as we have noted 
elsewhere, given the posture of the case, we must assume for purposes of decision 
that the patients did not consent to the searches, and we leave the question of 
consent for the Court of Appeals to determine. 
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 n.24 (citation omitted).  This rejoinder is confused.  It conflates 
consent to search by law enforcement with the entirely distinct question of whether the initial 
transmission of evidence—to a party other than law enforcement—was consensual.  The 
Ferguson majority is correct that its opinion makes no pronouncement, one way or the other, 
on the first question.  Justice Scalia’s point, however, is not that the patients consented to 
search by law enforcement (though, of course, he may also believe that).  His point is that 
the patients consensually gave urine samples to their doctors, which means—according to 
Scalia—that the patients assumed the risk that the doctors would betray their trust.  If so, 
they can raise no Fourth Amendment grievance, not because they “consented to the 
searches,” as the majority claims, but because no search occurred. 
  By analogy, the difference here is between (1) telling a police officer, “You may 
search my car,” which results in the officer finding a bag of cocaine, and (2) having a 
mechanic stumble on a bag of cocaine in your car, which he takes and gives to the police.  In 
the first example, you consented to search—a search occurred, but it was justified.  In the 
second example, no search occurred.  As long as the mechanic is not an agent of law 
enforcement, he may dispose of the incriminating evidence as he sees fit—the Fourth 
Amendment does not even enter the equation. 
 74. See id. at 94–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 75. That Ferguson did not formally reach the “search” question is sometimes invoked to 
explain the case away.  These efforts find themselves in the analytically unfortunate position 
of citing the fact that Ferguson does not address the threshold search issue as evidence that a 
search did not occur.  This is manifestly backward. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for 
an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01, 2014 WL 5463097, at *7 
n.9 (FISA Ct. Mar. 20, 2014). 
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Ferguson applied to phone calls, the result would be that not only are police 
prohibited from tapping phones, but also that the party on the other line—
the party in the position analogous to a doctor—is prohibited from 
disclosing the contents of the call to the police.  But that, of course, is not 
the constitutional rule we have; nor, for reasons explained more fully 
below, is it the constitutional rule we want. 
Ultimately, the point is not that Ferguson upends Katz.  On the contrary, 
Ferguson and Katz coexist—and should continue to coexist—happily.  The 
point is that their coexistence lodges a challenge to the familiar doctrinal 
story.  Either (1) Ferguson is wrongly decided, or (2) the axiom that the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect misplaced trust is, in fact, no axiom at 
all—it is simply a default rule, subject to exceptions.  And one of those 
exceptions is the doctor-patient relationship. 
2.  Hotels 
Now for the second exception—hotels.  In two cases, the Court has held 
definitively that hotel managers may not grant police access to a guest’s 
premises, even if the hotel manager himself has permission to enter those 
premises.76  The first case is United States v. Jeffers.77  There, police 
acquired a key to a hotel guest’s room from the assistant manager and 
proceeded to enter the room without obtaining consent from anyone; neither 
the defendant nor his aunt (who was renting the room and with whom the 
defendant was staying at the time) was present when the police entered.78  
Inside the room, the police found a bevy of narcotics evidence.79  When the 
search was challenged, the Government conceded that their actions were 
unlawful as against the defendant’s aunt.80  But the Government argued, 
nevertheless, that its actions were not unlawful as to the defendant because 
 
 76. There is a third case in this constellation, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 
(1961), presenting the identical issue except with regard to a landlord, not a hotel manager.  
Because hotel managers offer a closer analogy to doctors—and because, for the purposes of 
constitutional privacy, what is true of a temporary residence like a hotel room is surely true, 
a fortiori, of a permanent residence like an apartment—I will summarize Chapman only 
briefly here.  The police obtained permission from a tenant’s landlord to enter the tenant’s 
apartment. Id. at 612.  When the tenant moved to suppress evidence procured during the 
apartment’s search, the Government argued that the landlord had consented to it, effectively 
waiving the tenant’s Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 616. 
  The Court rejected this argument, citing two rationales.  First, the Court could find 
no case under the property laws and landlord-tenant laws of the relevant jurisdiction (in this 
case, Georgia) authorizing landlords to enter a tenant’s premises merely because they 
suspect that criminal activity might be going on. Id.  What a landlord was not authorized to 
do himself, the Court reasoned, surely he could not authorize another person to do. Id. 
  Second, the Court concluded that in fashioning the “procedural protections accorded 
to those charged with crime,” constitutional law “ought not to bow” to “the body of private 
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by 
distinctions whose validity is largely historical.” Id. at 617 (quoting Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257, 266–67 (1960)). 
 77. 342 U.S. 48 (1951). 
 78. Id. at 50. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 51. 
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he was not the one formally renting the room.81  The Court disagreed.  It 
reasoned that what was unlawful (by the Government’s own admission) as 
applied to one occupant was also unlawful as applied to the other,82 so the 
evidence was tossed.83 
The second case—a more lucrative doctrinal resource—is Stoner v. 
California.84  There, as in Jeffers, police obtained consent (and a key) from 
a hotel manager to search an occupant’s room, where they located evidence 
of criminal activity.85  The question presented was whether, as in Jeffers, it 
was unconstitutional for the police to enter the defendant’s hotel room 
simply on the basis of another party’s consent.86  The Court agreed, 
describing the constitutional right in question as one that 
only the petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through 
an agent . . . [and] there is nothing in the record to indicate that the police 
had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been 
authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search [his] room.87 
In other words, the defendant’s acquiescence to the hotel’s policy requiring 
him to “place[] [his key] in the mail box each time [he] left the hotel”88—
thereby exposing potentially sensitive information to the hotel staff—did 
not expose him to the risk of the staff’s cooperation with law enforcement. 
It may seem odd to invoke these cases alongside Ferguson.  Where the 
latter seems to pick out a socially distinctive relationship for elevated 
protection, the hotel cases—one might argue—achieve nothing so 
luminous; they seem like humdrum applications of agency law, transplanted 
to the Fourth Amendment setting.  By granting someone else access to your 
temporary dwelling space, you do not necessarily run the risk that he, in 
turn, will grant someone else access to that space.  What great triumph is 
there in that? 
There are two responses to this question, and they interpenetrate.  The 
first response is that the “agency principles” on exhibit in Jeffers and Stoner 
are not as humdrum as initial appearances might imply.  After all, the Court 
sees the agency question quite differently when it is not a hotel manager, 
but instead a cotenant or a guest, who authorizes the police to enter a 
residence.  In United States v. Matlock, the Court made clear that when 
someone with shared authority over the premises invites the police in, no 
Fourth Amendment violation occurs.89  And in Illinois v. Rodriguez,90 the 
 
 81. Id. at 52. 
 82. Id. at 52–53. 
 83. Id. at 54. 
 84. 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
 85. Id. at 485–86. 
 86. Id. at 484. 
 87. Id. at 489. 
 88. Id. at 485. 
 89. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 168–69 (1974) (finding consent by cotenant 
to enter apartment justified law enforcement search). Compare Georgia v. Randolph, 547 
U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (holding that if both cotenants are present, and one invokes his Fourth 
Amendment rights, that invocation trumps the other’s consent), with Fernandez v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014) (holding that consent of cotenant sufficed to justify search after 
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Court extended this core principle—and outcome—to situations where 
someone only appears to have shared authority.91  Whether someone else’s 
authority over my premises is actual or merely apparent, I run the risk that 
he or she will consent to entry by law enforcement. 
The scope of the latter principle bears emphasizing.  In light of the 
“misplaced trust” principle, it is of little surprise that someone with actual 
shared authority over premises may consent to entry by law enforcement.  
For the reasons set forth above, space, like information, is something that 
can be entrusted:  if A invites B into her home, and all the more so if A 
decides to cohabitate with B, A runs the risk of B betraying their residence 
(so to speak) to the police. 
But what about apparent authority?  It is hard to see why the “misplaced 
trust” principle would authorize someone with the mere appearance of 
authority to consent to entry by law enforcement.  No actual “entrustment” 
occurred.  So it strains plausibility to say that the tenant’s trust, which had 
not been “placed” in the first instance, had been misplaced.  Furthermore, 
the “consent by apparent authority” rule is difficult to square with Stoner, 
which—as the defendant in Rodriguez pointed out—explicitly held that “the 
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded . . . by 
unrealistic doctrines of ‘apparent authority.’”92 
Appreciating this difficulty, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rodriguez 
addressed the case’s seeming tension with Stoner head on.  In Justice 
Scalia’s view, the Stoner opinion—with its high-flying rhetoric about 
apparent authority—was ambiguous between two views.93  First, the Stoner 
Court might have meant that it would always be unrealistic to let apparent 
authority “erode” Fourth Amendment protection; it might have been 
drawing a categorical line.94  Second, the Stoner Court might have been 
saying that it was unrealistic, on the specific facts of Stoner, to conclude 
that the hotel manager actually had apparent authority.95  Justice Scalia—
and a majority of the Court—favored the latter interpretation. 
On the Rodriguez Court’s reading of Stoner, then, the latter stands for the 
proposition that “the police could not rely upon the obtained consent 
because they knew it came from a hotel clerk, knew that the room was 
rented and exclusively occupied by the defendant, and could not reasonably 
have believed that the [hotel manager] had general access to or control over 
the [room].”96  In this light, even if Jeffers and Stoner are about applying 
agency law principles to the Fourth Amendment setting, the way they do so 
still sheds light on the conceptual architecture of constitutional privacy.  
They underscore the importance of relationships, the difference between 
 
the other tenant (1) had invoked his Randolph rights, but (2) had been removed from the 
premises). 
 90. 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
 91. See id. at 186. 
 92. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488. 
 93. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 187–89. 
 94. See id. at 187. 
 95. See id. at 186–88. 
 96. Id. at 188. 
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granting an intimate (a spouse, a friend, or a family member) access to 
one’s private space, as opposed to granting a hotel manager the same. 
But Jeffers and Stoner also invite a more expansive reading.  Suppose 
that, in Stoner, the hotel manager did not simply show the police to the door 
and (literally) turn the key.  Instead, when the police arrived, the hotel 
manager said:  “I’ll tell you what—how about, instead of having me let you 
into the room, I’ll go in, see what I can find, and bring it out for you.”97  
Would the result be different?  One could, of course, argue that the police in 
this hypothetical instigated the hotel manager’s activity, rendering him a de 
facto agent of law enforcement and bringing the search back into the Fourth 
Amendment’s sweep.  But this route, in addition to straining existing case 
law,98 also sells short the larger point.  Namely, it seems odd, given the 
Stoner Court’s clear determination that the hotel manager could not let the 
police in, to conclude that the hotel manager would be permitted to simply 
go in to the room and, say, empty all of its contents into the hall.  Suppose, 
for example, that the manager, having seen a report on the local news about 
a recent robbery, took it upon himself to search through every hotel room 
for evidence of the crime, and when the police arrive, the hotel manager 
already has the incriminating evidence waiting for them.  Would that be 
permissible? 
To be sure, there is no logical contradiction between (1) the idea that the 
police may not enter a hotel room on consent of the hotel manager, and (2) 
the idea that the hotel manager may enter a hotel room himself, and relay 
whatever he finds there to law enforcement.  The absence of a logical 
contradiction is what makes the reading “expansive.”  But the more 
expansive reading also strikes me as the far more persuasive one—for it 
seems quite implausible that Stoner would come down, ultimately, to the 
way the hotel manager betrayed the confidence of his guest, as opposed to 
the fact of betrayal.99 
 
 97. For fun, we can imagine even more fanciful versions of the hypothetical.  Suppose 
the hotel manager says, “I’m worried that if I let you into the room, whatever evidence you 
find will ultimately be tossed.  But I’ve read the Jacobsen case”—which, without a time 
machine or great prescience, the hotel manager in Stoner could not have done; but the point 
still stands—“so I know that if I perform the search, and I bring the evidence back out to 
you, there’s no Fourth Amendment problem.  So sit tight.” 
 98. See infra notes 103–10 and accompanying text. 
 99. See United States v. Spicer, 432 F. App’x 522 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
private search rule—allowing law enforcement to retrace the steps of private actors who 
have already performed a search—does not apply to hotel rooms because they are, in 
essence, residences); United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 720–21 (9th Cir. 2009) (drawing 
on Stoner to hold that it was a Fourth Amendment violation when security personnel at a 
hotel—private employees—engaged in a search of defendant’s hotel room, opened suitcases 
to locate contraband, and gave the contraband to the police); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 
547 U.S. 103, 112 (2006) (“[A] hotel manager calls up no customary understanding of 
authority to admit guests without the consent of the current occupant . . . and a hotel guest 
customarily has no reason to expect the manager to allow anyone but his own employees 
into his room.”). But see United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1219–21 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(finding no violation for hotel manager to turn over to law enforcement contraband that 
defendant had abandoned in his room, despite the fact that defendant had instructed the hotel 
manager to convey the contraband to his lawyer); State v. Weekley, 27 P.3d 325, 329–30 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding it was private action outside the Fourth Amendment’s 
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In my view, Stoner vindicates the grander of these principles.  It stands 
for the proposition that hotel managers, because they are hotel managers, 
are not permitted to betray guests to law enforcement—even when they do 
so voluntarily, even when it is they, not police officers, who perform the 
searches in question.100  Here, as in Ferguson, something about the 
underlying relationship makes it normatively inappropriate to speak of trust 
being “misplaced.”  Just as it would misconstrue the act of giving a urine 
sample to a doctor to conclude that a patient has “assumed the risk” of 
betrayal by her doctor, it also misunderstands the act of leaving room keys 
at the front desk of a hotel to conclude that a hotel guest has “assumed the 
risk” of betrayal by hotel staff.  In both settings, widespread expectations 
are to the contrary. 
D.  An Objection:  State Agency 
Very well—but even supposing these heterodox interpretations succeed, 
and the Court truly has picked out relationships with doctors and hotel 
managers for heightened protection, there is still an elephant in the room.  
What does it mean to say that private actors, cooperating with law 
enforcement of their own volition, are bound by the Fourth Amendment?  
The first principle of nearly all constitutional law is that the Constitution 
constrains state action, not private action.  Taking this principle seriously, 
how can the fiduciary rule get off the ground?  If Ferguson and Stoner 
stand for the proposition that certain types of private actors are bound by 
the strictures of the Constitution, perhaps the proper inference is simply that 
Ferguson and Stoner are wrong. 
Although other, more overtly normative responses are conceivable,101 the 
simplest response is that Fourth Amendment law has long contained a “state 
 
reach when hotel staff searched a guest’s room); Glass v. State, 696 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2010) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation for maid to report contraband 
witnessed in hotel room). 
 100. See Young, 573 F.3d at 720–21; United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 698–700 (6th 
Cir. 1997).  In Allen, the court held that the defendant lacked an expectation of privacy in his 
hotel room because he had been locked out of the room when management learned that he 
was using it to store contraband.  But in so holding, the court also suggested that a search 
carried out by hotel management, before locking defendant out of the room, would have 
been subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny notwithstanding Jacobsen. Id. at 699 (“Unlike 
the package in Jacobsen, however, which ‘contained nothing but contraband,’ Allen’s motel 
room was a temporary abode containing personal possessions.  Allen had a legitimate and 
significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room . . . .  [T]his Court is unwilling 
to extend the holding in Jacobsen to cases involving private searches of residences.” 
(quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984))); see also United States 
v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1020–21 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the same reasoning—and 
refusing to extend Jacobsen on the same grounds—in the context of a home, when the owner 
let a handyman in to perform repairs on the roof). 
 101. It is possible, for example, to answer the state action challenge by severing duties 
from remedies and arguing that even if “Fourth Amendment fiduciaries” are not bound by 
the Constitution (due to their private status), the exclusionary remedy (and perhaps also civil 
remedies) should be available to defendants whose incrimination was built on cooperation 
between fiduciaries and law enforcement.  Normally, we think of constitutional right 
violations (and resulting remedies) in one-to-one correspondence with constitutional duties.  
If A claims that B violated his constitutional rights, the meaning of A’s grievance is that B 
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agency” principle—an appreciation of the fact that private actors sometimes 
become extensions of law enforcement and that, when they do, the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections come back into play.  In this light, the fiduciary 
rule does not undermine the state action requirement.  It merely provides a 
more realistic—and normatively appealing—gloss on what it means for 
private actors to operate as “state agents.”102 
As it stands, the case law about when private actors operate as state 
agents is checkered at best.  The Supreme Court has been virtually silent on 
the matter,103 and appellate courts have yet to converge on clear standards.  
Everyone seems to agree that if a private actor is legally required to assist 
 
had a duty (to A) that B failed to discharge.  But this relationship between rights, remedies, 
and duties is contingent, not necessary.  In fact, there are times when constitutional rights are 
violated, and remedies are available, despite the fact that the party initially responsible for 
the violation, in light of her status as a private actor, has no corresponding constitutional 
duty. 
  One clear example is ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Sixth Amendment has 
long been understood to ensure that criminal defendants receive adequate legal 
representation.  One implication of this guarantee is that states must fund representation for 
indigent defendants. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2010); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340–41 (1963).  But another implication is that when a 
defendant—any defendant—does not receive effective assistance from competent counsel, 
she has constitutional recourse:  under some circumstances, she can demand a new trial; 
under other circumstances, she can revive expired plea deals; and so forth. See, e.g., 
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012) (holding that a defendant who was never 
informed of a favorable plea deal should be allowed to reconsider the deal and have it 
reinstated nunc pro tunc); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (clarifying that the Sixth 
Amendment applies to plea bargains); Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 
2001) (granting a new trial due to ineffective assistance when counsel failed to strike a juror 
who admitted bias).  Crucially, these constitutional remedies are available whether the 
attorney is in private practice or employed by the government.  No one believes—nor would 
it make normative sense to suggest—that Sixth Amendment remedies should hinge on that 
distinction or that, by choosing to hire private counsel rather than work with a public 
defender, a criminal defendant waives her right to constitutional remedies in the event of 
ineffective assistance.  Who signs the lawyer’s paycheck is irrelevant.  The Constitution 
forbids the state from subjecting an inadequately represented defendant to (certain forms of) 
criminal liability, whether or not a state actor provided the representation.  Likewise, perhaps 
in the Fourth Amendment setting, although information fiduciaries are not bound by the 
Fourth Amendment (just as private attorneys are not bound by the Sixth), law enforcement is 
prohibited from relying on—and prosecutors, from introducing—evidence procured by 
particularly intrusive means, whether or not a state actor was initially responsible for the 
intrusion. 
 102. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is 
“inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private 
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge 
of any governmental official’” (emphasis added) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 
649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))). 
 103. Jacobsen is one of the few cases on point, and because it held that the FedEx 
workers were not government agents, it ultimately sheds little light on what such agency 
consists of.  The only other major Supreme Court case is Skinner, which held that a private 
railway was a state agent when it screened its employees for drug use, due to the extensive 
regulations related to such screening. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.  For a 
possible explanation as to why the private search doctrine has received comparatively little 
elaboration, see Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 
643, 662 (2013) (arguing that the private search rule has fused together with the plain view 
rule, such that “private searches” are really just a subset of cases in which a law enforcement 
official becomes alerted to something incriminating through no action of her own). 
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the police, the private actor becomes a state agent.104  Likewise, there 
appears to be consensus that when private actors receive monetary 
compensation (or other quid pro quo consideration) for assisting the police, 
they should be treated as state agents.105  Less clear are cases where 
assistance is neither instigated nor compensated by the state but nonetheless 
reflects an endogenous desire on the part of a private actor to aid law 
enforcement.  Some courts express support for the view that “law 
enforcement motivation” can suffice, on its own, to transform otherwise-
private activity into a Fourth Amendment search.106  Other courts 
disagree.107  And some opt for a split-the-difference approach, one that 
 
 104. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (holding that it 
constituted a “search” when a private railroad company performed urine tests on its 
employees pursuant to a federal statute).  The principle reaches beyond formal compulsion.  
It also encompasses situations where law enforcement provides substantial support to an 
otherwise-private search. See id. at 614–15 (applying Fourth Amendment scrutiny to drug 
testing carried out by private railway companies, due to the existence of federal regulations 
that facilitated the testing); United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(holding private investigative activity can qualify as a Fourth Amendment search, even if not 
formally compelled, insofar as the government “demonstrate[s] a strong . . . preference for 
[it]”); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although a wholly private 
search falls outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted by private 
individuals at the instigation of a government officer or authority constitutes a governmental 
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that an 
anonymous hacker’s search for child pornography did not violate the Fourth Amendment, 
despite being a crime, because the government did not “participate[]” in the search, but 
noting that the analysis would be different in the event that the government compensated the 
hacker); United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a technician’s 
discovery of files on defendant’s computer, “made pursuant to . . . maintenance work” that 
“[t]he Government had no knowledge [of]” and for which it paid the technician no “reward,” 
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 848 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that a FedEx employee with a predilection for searching customers’ 
packages was not operating as a state agent because, inter alia, the employee had “never 
worked as an informant for the DEA, ha[d] never been rewarded by the DEA for his aid, nor 
even discussed with law enforcement authorities what to look for” (emphasis added)). 
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
for a search to be private, “the intent of the private party conducting the search [must be] 
entirely independent of the government’s intent to collect evidence for use in a criminal 
prosecution” (quoting United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 418 (6th Cir. 2008))); United 
States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing, as one variable in determining whether 
a search is truly private, “the extent to which the private party aims primarily to help the 
government or to serve its own interests”); United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (an otherwise-private search meets with Fourth Amendment scrutiny if “its 
purpose [is] to elicit a benefit for the government in either its investigative or administrative 
capacities”); see also Joshuah Lisk, Comment, Is Batman a State Actor?:  The Dark Knight’s 
Relationship with the Gotham City Police Department and the Fourth Amendment 
Implications, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1419, 1431–32 nn.65–72 (2014) (discussing the 
applicability of the private search doctrine to searches carried out exclusively for a law 
enforcement purpose). 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1053–54 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that even if a bookkeeper was “motivated, to some extent, by an urge to help the 
government, either as a means of protecting herself through the prospect of immunity or by 
the ‘simple but often powerful convention of openness and honesty,’” that “is not enough to 
make her a government agent” in the absence of instigation by law enforcement (quoting 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971))); United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 
1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1996) (for a private search to constitute state action, “the 
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regards “law enforcement motivation” as one potentially—but not 
necessarily—dispositive variable in the analysis.108 
Against this backdrop, the fiduciary rule can be understood as a way of 
designating a particular type of private activity—the voluntary assistance of 
law enforcement by information fiduciaries—as de facto state action.  So 
understood, the fiduciary rule overlaps analytically with the idea of 
“entwinement” that the Court has developed in other settings that pose 
difficult issues of state action.  In the bankruptcy context, for example, the 
Court has construed the wrongful attachment of property (in anticipation of 
bankruptcy) as state action for the purpose of bringing due process 
claims.109  Accordingly, it has allowed § 1983 actions to proceed not only 
against the judicial officers who wrongfully issue writs of attachment but 
also against a private actor who wrongfully requests a writ of attachment.  
In essence, the Court’s reasoning was that because the request for a writ is 
what puts the wheels of attachment in motion, the request qualifies, by 
itself, as state action—even if not instigated by the government.110 
 
government . . . must . . . affirmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action,” or 
put otherwise, the question turns on whether “the government coerces, dominates or directs 
the actions of a private person” (emphasis added) (quoting Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 
796 (10th Cir. 1989))). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Momoh, 427 F.3d 137, 140–41 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(enumerating the following factors as relevant in distinguishing private and government 
action for Fourth Amendment purposes:  “the extent of the government’s role in instigating 
or participating in the search, its intent and the degree of control it exercises over the search 
and the private party, and the extent to which the private party aims primarily to help the 
government or to serve its own interests” (quoting Pervaz, 118 F.3d at 6)); United States v. 
Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003) (describing the state agency test as a “fact-
intensive inquiry” that asks “whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the 
intrusive conduct and whether the private party’s purpose for conducting the search was to 
assist law enforcement efforts or to further her own ends” (quoting United States v. Feffer, 
831 F.2d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1987))). 
 109. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 341–42 (1969). 
 110. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 933 (1982) (explaining that, in the 
typical case involving the attachment of property by a creditor, although “state agents aid[] 
the creditor in securing the disputed property[,] . . . the federal [due process challenge] 
ar[ises] in litigation between creditor and debtor in the state courts and no state official [i]s 
named as a party,” but that this fact does not frustrate the federal court’s ability to 
“entertain[] and adjudicate[] the defendant-debtor’s claim that the procedure under which the 
private creditor secured the disputed property violated federal constitutional standards of due 
process”); id. at 941 (“[W]e have consistently held that a private party’s joint participation 
with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party 
as a ‘state actor’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id. at 927 n.6 (“Joint action 
with a state official to accomplish a prejudgment deprivation of a constitutionally protected 
property interest will support a § 1983 claim against a private party.”).  For other cases along 
these lines, see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 
(2001) (stating that a private actor is subject to the Constitution “when a private actor 
operates as a ‘willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents’” (quoting 
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941)); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (“[The] State . . . can 
be held responsible for a private decision . . . when it has exercised coercive power or has 
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert . . . .”); Evans v. Newton, 
382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (explaining that “[c]onduct that is formally ‘private’ may become 
so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as 
to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action,” and applying 
the principle to a municipality’s acting as trustee to a private estate).  For further background 
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So, too, in the law enforcement setting:  a private actor that assists the 
police voluntarily is no less “entwined” with an inherently public function 
than she would be if the police were compelling her cooperation.  It is 
unclear in principle, and the Court has offered no convincing explanation in 
practice, why chronology—who initiates the entwinement—should drive 
the analysis.  If the concern is about private actors using the machinery of 
state power to imperil the interests of other private actors, it would seem 
more natural to focus on the presence (or absence) of entwinement as such, 
not on its origin.  That is, it would seem more natural to focus on whether 
the private actor in question actually was entwined with law enforcement, 
instead of how the entwinement came about.111  Indeed, this is exactly what 
some appellate courts have done by applying Fourth Amendment scrutiny 
to private action simply because it stemmed, in the first instance, from a 
desire to aid law enforcement. 
For reasons explained more fully below, I believe these courts go too far.  
There are both normative and pragmatic reasons to leave private actors free, 
as a general matter, to assist the authorities, which is exactly why the 
misplaced trust rule makes sense as a default.112  But even if the 
entwinement principle should not apply to all voluntary cooperation with 
law enforcement, it should certainly apply—as I argue below—to voluntary 
cooperation by information fiduciaries.  When information fiduciaries step 
into the shoes of law enforcement, they have the capacity, because of their 
 
on the “entwinement” principle, see Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of 
Expression in the Age of Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 152–53 (2014). 
 111. Another way to put this point would be that limiting the ability of information 
fiduciaries to share information with law enforcement is, in practice, really just a way of 
constraining the way law enforcement officials gather information.  In other words, 
constitutional protection actually attaches to the receipt of evidence, not to its transmission; 
the rule prohibits law enforcement from, for example, capitalizing on a doctor’s decision to 
betray her patient.  Or, more exactly put, the rule requires that law enforcement, in order to 
capitalize on a doctor’s decision to betray her patient, must ensure that the overall process of 
collection and disclosure complies with the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” 
requirement.  Among other things, this framing helps to sow the beginnings of a distinction 
between dragnet surveillance programs—like the one described in Ferguson—and garden 
variety mandated reporter laws, which obligate doctors (among other actors) to report certain 
kinds of dangerous or harmful activity.  In those circumstances, the presence of dangerous 
behavior acts as an ipso facto Fourth Amendment safeguard, rendering an otherwise-
protected disclosure inherently reasonable.  In other words, one way to think about mandated 
reporter laws, within the confines of the fiduciary rule, is to say that reporting does amount 
to a search, but the search complies with the Fourth Amendment. See Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86–91 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining why, in his 
view, Ferguson does not reach mandated reporter laws). 
 112. Limiting the ability of private actors to assist law enforcement across the board—
that is, discarding the misplaced trust rule in its entirety—would lead to both normative and 
doctrinal problems. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115–16 (2006) (noting a 
person’s “interest as a citizen in bringing criminal activity to light”); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488–89 (1971) (safeguarding the ability of one spouse to 
intentionally transmit to law enforcement incriminating evidence about the other); cf. On Lee 
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 756 (1952) (“Society can ill afford to throw away the 
evidence produced by the falling out, jealousies, and quarrels of those who live by outwitting 
the law.  Certainly no one would foreclose the turning of state’s evidence by denizens of the 
underworld.”). 
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role, to violate expectations of privacy in a different way than other private 
actors.  The sense in which that is true—and what it means for the 
conceptual structure of Fourth Amendment law—are the topics addressed in 
the rest of this Article. 
II.  THE NORMATIVE PUZZLE 
The proposition that the law of searches consists of two—and only two—
tiers has hobbled efforts to retool Fourth Amendment doctrine for the 
digital age.  Beginning from the premise that sharing information results 
either in (1) exposure, or (2) misplaced trust, scholars have focused on 
dialing protection upward, on explaining why certain cases currently 
analyzed under the exposure rule should, instead, be analyzed under the 
misplaced trust rule. 
As a result, criticism of existing doctrine, for all its fervency, ends up 
having limited bite.  Although scholars and judges have spared no effort 
putting the lash to Smith and Miller, they have left unanswered—indeed, 
unasked—how the Fourth Amendment bears on voluntary private action.  
The urgency of this question, already on the rise, will only increase with 
time.  In today’s world, it is not just the occasional service provider—like a 
doctor or a hotel manager—who possesses sensitive information about us.  
A large (and growing) number of private entities currently have access to 
vast (and growing) stores of voluntarily conveyed information about all of 
us.  If these intermediaries are categorically free to cooperate with law 
enforcement—if their use of our information falls totally outside the bounds 
of Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as the traditional story would imply—the 
erosion of privacy will be unforgiving and swift. 
In response, this part draws on the foregoing doctrinal analysis to 
develop a tiered account of constitutional privacy, centered on relationships.  
To do so, I draw on the law of fiduciary duties and, in particular, on Jack 
Balkin’s concept of “information fiduciaries.”113  The common thread 
uniting the two examples from Part I—doctors and hotel managers—is that 
both hold sensitive information for the benefit of the would-be suspect or 
defendant.  For them to share sensitive information with law enforcement 
would, therefore, flout an implied limitation on its use. 
Ultimately, the question becomes, how can information fiduciaries be 
distinguished from other parties—friends, family members, colleagues, and 
so forth—with whom we routinely share sensitive information, expecting it 
to be kept in (some degree of) confidence?  The answer, I suggest, is 
twofold.  First, we share information with fiduciaries despite the fact that 
we have no reason, in the everyday sense of the term, to trust them.  
Second, because of the social functions that information fiduciaries serve, 
the decision to share sensitive information with them is, practically 
speaking, involuntary.  In my view, these considerations render informal 
systems of social regulation insufficient to ensure integrity, and they make 
it necessary for implied legal duties to fill the gap.  Before building out this 
 
 113. Balkin, supra note 5. 
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answer, however, it will be useful to examine where the existing criticism 
of Fourth Amendment law stands—and what it has missed. 
A.  Existing Commentary 
To date, the Fourth Amendment reform effort, among both scholars and 
lower court judges, has focused on explaining why fact patterns 
traditionally analyzed as “exposure” cases should be analyzed, instead, as 
“misplaced trust” cases.  The effort begins from two conceptually distinct 
(though often overlapping) starting points.  The first focuses on the type of 
information at stake; the second, on the amount of such information. 
1.  Type of Information 
The first approach to reform—primarily aimed at the third-party 
doctrine—has been to emphasize the sensitive nature of the information we 
share with counterparties today.  1979 is gone.  Today, it is not just dialed 
numbers being disclosed to telephone companies; it is all manner of highly 
personal information being disclosed to internet service providers, social 
media sites, and the like—often by virtue of arcane user agreements that 
garner our consent only in the thinnest sense of the phrase.114 
In response to this reality, scholars have long been clamoring for the 
abolition of Smith and Miller and the ill-formed theory of “exposure” on 
which they rest.115  Stephen Henderson, for example, regards the third-party 
doctrine as “fundamentally misguided,”116 among other reasons because it 
fails to distinguish between recipients of sensitive information (such as 
friends and loved ones) and conduits of sensitive information (such as 
Google).117  In a similar vein, Jed Rubenfeld has argued that the third-party 
doctrine, if followed to its logical end, would render “the Fourth 
Amendment . . . a hollow shell, because in an increasingly digitized, 
networked world with ever-expanding privacy-invading technologies, 
virtually all information is exposed to third parties.”118  Indeed, according 
to Rubenfeld, even Katz is not safe from the doctrine’s ruinous touch, 
because “[e]ven Katz had exposed the seized information to a third 
 
 114. See David A. Anderson, Privacy and Fictitious Contracts, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
11, 13–14 (2009) (explaining the “preposterous[]” way that “law treats our acquiescence [to 
form contracts] as if we had bargained with the entity and reached a mutually agreeable 
solution”). 
 115. See generally Colb, supra note 11 (demonstrating how both steps of the logic of the 
third-party doctrine—equating risk with invitation and equating large intrusions with small 
ones—fall off the bone conceptually). See also Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2572448 
(noting that “[t]he third party doctrine may be dismantled soon, and for good reason [as] [i]t 
always strained the logic and common sense of search and seizure law”) [http://perma.cc/ 
C6CE-KNKL]; Selbst, supra note 103, at 668 (describing the third-party doctrine originating 
in Smith and Miller as the “favorite villain” of Fourth Amendment scholars). 
 116. Henderson, Timely Demise, supra note 11, at 40. 
 117. See id. at 40 & nn.6–8; see also Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the 
Sun?:  A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. 
REV. 507, 524–28 (2005). 
 118. Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 115. 
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party,”119 which means, on a strict reading of Smith and Miller, that Katz 
lost his expectation of privacy the minute he picked up the phone.120  
Furthermore, even if the distinction between “content” and “noncontent” 
information successfully distinguished Smith from Katz when the former 
came down, the coherence of that distinction has long since fallen to ash.  
For in the digital age, “noncontent information may reveal”—and 
increasingly does reveal—“as much, if not more, intimate [knowledge] 
about users than the content of communications do.”121 
Other scholars have focused on drawing analogies outside of Fourth 
Amendment law.  Susan Brenner, for example, has likened digital service 
providers to servants at common law.122  Because the common law 
recognized “a concept of ‘shared privacy,’” it understood servants as an 
extension of the household; interrogating them—or compelling their 
testimony—was equivalent to interrogating or compelling testimony from 
other members of the family.123  In a similar vein, Monu Bedi has invoked 
the idea of “inter-personal privacy”—an idea that he ties back to 
fundamental rights cases, such as Lawrence v. Texas124—to explain why the 
aggressive variant of the third-party doctrine offered in Smith and Miller 
should not apply to communication over Facebook.125  Bedi argues, in 
essence, that because Facebook is a forum in which we exercise our privacy 
rights, to exempt information shared with Facebook from privacy protection 
would drain those rights of practical meaning.126 
Kathy Strandburg has coined a phrase that aptly summarizes the 
sensibility underlying these positions:  “technosocial continuity.”127  Just as 
“the special solicitude for the home and office” in Fourth Amendment law 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id.  Of course, the Court has not been inclined to construe Smith and Miller this 
way—a fact that to some scholars suggests the third-party doctrine is not the sturdy 
foundation that appearances imply. See supra note 28. 
 121. Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations:  Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of 
Total Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 488 (2014); see also Simon Stern, The 
Third-Party Doctrine and the Third Person, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 364, 391–92 (2013) 
(exploring ways in which “no content” data in fact can embed far more—and richer—
information than “content” data); Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and 
Freedom of Association’s Specificity Requirement, 10 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 327 
(2014) (exploring the breathtaking sweep of metadata collection efforts today and the 
“associational information” they reveal); Jane Mayer, What’s the Matter with Metadata?, 
NEW YORKER (June 6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whats-the-matter-
with-metadata [http://perma.cc/84PK-VL5W].  Nita Farahany has come up with a 
particularly clever example of where the distinction between content and noncontent 
information breaks down:  situations where it is necessary to dial numbers in order to 
navigate a menu. See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1252 
(2012). 
 122. Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 
MISS. L.J. 1, 76 (2005). 
 123. Id. at 80–81. 
 124. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 125. Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy:  Why the Third Party Doctrine 
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2–5, 15–36 (2013). 
 126. Id. at 29–32. 
 127. Strandburg, supra note 11, at 619. 
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stems from the “social functions [those] places perform,”128 new practices 
like “social media and cloud computing” should also be recognized for the 
social functions they perform and for the “social changes [they have] 
occasioned.”129  To safeguard privacy in the digital age, therefore, we must 
update the rules that govern shared information, so as to recognize that 
sensitive information is shared today with many more entities, and many 
different kinds of entities, than ever before.  Applying the wooden rule from 
Smith and Miller to all such sharing would not only yield undesirable 
results, but would also disavow reality.  Instead, constitutional rules should 
be crafted “in a technosocially continuous manner,”130 which means, in 
practice, that they should “build upon” the forms of protection traditionally 
associated with the home.131  Put simply, the Fourth Amendment should be 
sensitive to social practice and should evolve, accordingly, as social 
practice evolves.132 
2.  Amount of Information 
The second approach to reform—which focuses more on traditional 
“exposure” cases than the third-party doctrine—has been to highlight the 
sheer amount of information we share with counterparties today.  The most 
prominent advocates of this approach are Danielle Citron and David Gray, 
who argue that the digital age is distinctive, as far as privacy is concerned, 
 
 128. Id. at 659. 
 129. Id. at 650. 
 130. Id. at 658. 
 131. Id.  Similar trends can be ascertained from recent judicial opinions. See, e.g., Riley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“A phone not only contains in digital form many 
sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private 
information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.”); United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (musing that, in the digital 
age, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” due to the fact 
that “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course 
of carrying out mundane tasks”). 
 132. This view is widely shared in all privacy scholarship, not just commentary on the 
Fourth Amendment.  Indeed, one of the benefits of the fiduciary rule, in my view, is that it 
incorporates—and packages in doctrinally operational form—the insights of various privacy 
theorists that have emphasized the importance of contextual variance in privacy norms. See, 
e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF:  LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT:  TECHNOLOGY, 
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 129–31 (2010) (arguing for an approach to 
privacy policy that focuses on “contextual integrity” and attention to the actuality of social 
practice); Anita L. Allen, Privacy-As-Data Control:  Conceptual, Practical, and Moral 
Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 866 (2000); Daniel J. Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1093, 1128 (2002) (arguing that “privacy” 
is a porous concept and that its meaning and normative salience differs depending on the 
context).  I am not the first to relate these “context-based” accounts of privacy—which are 
pitched at a high level of abstraction and tend to be explicitly normative in character—to 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.  For perhaps the most ambitious effort along these lines, see 
Selbst, supra note 103 (drawing on Helen Nissenbaum’s work on “contextual integrity” and 
seeking to make expectations about “information flow” the touchstone of constitutional 
privacy); see also Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 1249 (2012). 
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because of the means of data collection available today.133  In a way that 
has never been true before, it is now possible (for law enforcement and 
private parties alike) to cheaply amass and archive enormous volumes of 
information.  From this observation, Citron and Gray conclude that the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope—the threshold doctrinal question of which 
activities qualify, in the first place, as searches—must become responsive to 
the “how,” rather than the “what,” of surveillance.134  According to Citron 
and Gray, data collected by ordinary means poses no Fourth Amendment 
problem.  But data collected by enhanced means—means that were 
previously unavailable—does pose such a problem.  In their words: 
There is . . . no Fourth Amendment issue just because investigators collect 
a detailed mosaic of personal information on a suspect.  Rather, it is the 
means that matter.  Thus, the Fourth Amendment would not be implicated 
if a third party used pen registers or similar technology to gather evidence 
for the government because these technologies are too limited to facilitate 
the sort of broad and indiscriminate surveillance characteristic of a 
surveillance state.  By contrast, the data aggregation technologies 
deployed by Verizon and other telecommunications companies to provide 
the FBI and the NSA with “telephony metadata” for all calls “between the 
United States and abroad” and all calls “wholly within the United States, 
including local telephone calls” implicate “different constitutional 
principles.”  By virtue of their scale and scope, these data aggregation 
capacities . . . should . . . be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.135 
Other commentators agree.  Elizabeth Joh, for example, has made similar 
arguments in favor of rethinking the Court’s “abandoned DNA” 
jurisprudence.136  In a world where technological advancement has made it 
so that “nearly any ‘body particle’ can reveal entirely our genetic 
information,” limits should be placed on law enforcement’s ability to 
procure such “particles.”137  The upshot of Joh’s view is the same as Citron 
and Gray’s:  law enforcement is increasingly equipped with means of easily 
and cheaply collecting vast amounts of information about citizens—and in 
response, the Fourth Amendment must evolve.138 
 
 133. See Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total 
Surveillance:  A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013). 
 134. Id. at 267. 
 135. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
62, 143 (2013) (footnotes omitted); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 141, 147–52 (2014) (exploring the way that technological advances have 
rapidly intensified the amount of “public” information that can be seized and stored, putting 
normative strain on the “exposure” principle at the heart of much Fourth Amendment law). 
 136. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Essay, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA:  The Fourth 
Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006). See generally Erin 
Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab:  DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 161 (2013) (discussing the Fourth Amendment status of DNA collection and 
the specifically quantitative concerns that it inspires). 
 137. Joh, supra note 136, at 859–60. 
 138. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing By Numbers:  Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 
89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (arguing that the mosaic theory leads to 
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The quantitative approach, alternatively called the “mosaic theory,” also 
appears to be gaining traction in the courts.139  Although United States v. 
Jones was resolved (famously or infamously, depending on one’s view) on 
trespass grounds, five Justices seemed poised to resolve the case on 
quantitative grounds.140  Furthermore, a unanimous Court recently 
expressed support for the “quantitative privacy” view in Riley v. 
California,141 which held that, incident to an arrest, the police may not 
engage in the suspicionless search of a smart phone’s contents.142 
Indeed, Riley offers a good example of a setting in which the quantitative 
and qualitative approaches coalesce, as they often do.  The problem with 
allowing law enforcement to examine the contents of smart phones could be 
stated in two different, if overlapping, ways.143  To begin with, smart 
phones contain all sorts of sensitive information; by perusing someone’s 
phone for just a handful of minutes, I can learn many intimate details of 
their life.  Secondly, smart phones contain an enormous volume of 
information; in a different era, amassing the amount of data currently stored 
on smart phones today would have required invasive and prolonged 
investigation. 
 
considerable line-drawing problems and fails to capture the stakes of Fourth Amendment 
protection). 
 139. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that constitutional privacy doctrine should change in response to law 
enforcement-empowering technologies); ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 822–23 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“[R]ules that permit the government to obtain records and other information that 
consumers have shared with businesses without a warrant seem much more threatening as 
the extent of such information grows.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (No. 10-1259) (Chief Justice Roberts describing the distinction between following a car 
around for a few days and tracking the movements via GPS as “the difference between 
seeing a little tile and seeing a mosaic”).  It also has some support among state supreme 
courts (which are, of course, free to fashion greater parameters of protection than those 
fashioned by the U.S. Supreme Court). See, e.g., People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 142 
(Colo. 1983) (“[A] pen register record holds out the prospect of an even greater intrusion in 
privacy when the record itself is acquired by the government, which has a technological 
capacity to convert basic data into a virtual mosaic of a person’s life.”). 
 140. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan). 
 141. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 142. Id. at 2493.  The rhetoric in Riley is noticeably sweeping.  As Chief Justice Roberts 
put it: 
A cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information . . . that 
reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.  [And] a cell phone’s 
capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than 
previously possible.  The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed 
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions. 
Id. at 2489. 
 143. As Chief Justice Roberts aptly summarized the point, “[C]ell phones differ in both a 
quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s 
person.” Id.  And then, once again, emphasizing the confluence: 
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from physical records by 
quantity alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively different.  An Internet 
search and browsing history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled 
phone and could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—perhaps a 
search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD. 
Id. at 2490. 
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The same confluence is discernible in other Fourth Amendment settings 
as well.144  In Kyllo v. United States,145 for example, the Court held that a 
search occurred when law enforcement used an infrared scanner to detect 
heat emanating from a home.146  Although the majority opinion focused on 
the sensitive information that such scanning might yield, given its proximity 
to the home—with Justice Scalia waxing somber at the idea of capturing 
data about “the lady of the house tak[ing] her daily sauna and bath”147—the 
practice is also troubling on quantitative grounds.  Imagine if the scanner 
were left running for hours or days (or, as in Jones, months) on end.  Even 
if the scanner picked up nothing particularly sensitive—even if there was 
nothing particularly sensitive to pick up—law enforcement might 
nevertheless come away with a detailed mosaic of activity in the home.148 
B.  “Misplaced Trust” Presupposes Trust 
Ultimately, whether the fulcrum of reform is qualitative or quantitative, 
the goal is the same.  The point of the reform effort is to truck cases from 
the “exposure” tier to the “misplaced trust” tier.  In other words, the point is 
to explain why settings in which the Court has found that suspects have no 
expectation of privacy should, instead, be treated as settings in which 
suspects’ expectation of privacy remains intact, but the expectation can be 
violated (with constitutional impunity) by any counterparty to whom the 
information has been disclosed.  In other words, the point of the reform 
effort has been to equilibrate Fourth Amendment protection to the level of 
Katz, the Fourth Amendment’s traditional “lodestar.”149  And this makes 
sense.  In a doctrinal landscape haunted by Smith and Miller, the promise of 
Katz—that information voluntarily shared with another person might not 
lose all constitutional protection—is a significant promise indeed. 
But there is a problem.  For all that Katz protects against, the one thing it 
avowedly does not protect against is misplaced trust.  This leads to major 
difficulties in the digital age, when information is “entrusted” to third 
parties constantly, at a pace and quantity never before imagined.  Today, 
most interaction with other human beings, not to mention a ballooning 
number of everyday tasks, requires one to share information with countless 
third parties whose role—and profit source—is the intermediation of data.  
Email providers, social media sites, optimization companies like FitBit and 
 
 144. Indeed, in its way, DNA collection is another example of a practice that sounds 
alarm on both dimensions.  Beyond the quantitative concerns explored above, DNA 
collection also raises qualitative concerns, in light of the inherently sensitive nature of 
genetic information.  Though at some level, this would depend more than other examples on 
the particular use to which the captured data was being put. 
 145. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 146. Id. at 40. 
 147. Id. at 38. 
 148. Scalia offers a hypothetical along these lines, in a startling prefiguration of Google 
Earth—“a satellite capable of scanning from many miles away [that] pick[s] up only visible 
light emanating from a house,” allowing law enforcement to theoretically record everything 
visible from outside of a home (e.g., comings and goings) with impunity. Id. at 35. 
 149. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). 
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Nest Labs, GPS navigation systems—the list is long and growing.  The 
point is not that these entities are iniquitous.  They perform important 
services and improve the world.  But their presence in our lives—a less and 
less optional state of affairs—also makes it necessary to reconsider the role 
of the “misplaced trust” rule in Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
Consider Gmail.  I send an email to my sister, confessing that I stole a 
car.  In so doing, I have shared information—the same information—with 
both my sister and Google.  Each now possesses evidence that I stole a car.  
After sharing the information, what expectation of privacy, if any, do I 
retain?  The qualitative and quantitative approaches both supply the same to 
this question.  By sharing the information with Google, I have not—contra 
Smith and Miller—lost all ability to claim a privacy interest in it.  Put 
simply, it should not be the case that I waive my expectation of privacy in 
information simply by disclosing it to Google—just as it is not the case, 
under Katz, that I waive my expectation of privacy in information simply by 
disclosing it to my sister. 
The next question, however, becomes more complicated:  How, if at all, 
does the Fourth Amendment regulate voluntary transmission of the 
information—by my sister or by Google—to law enforcement?  In the case 
of my sister, the answer is clear:  under existing doctrine, she is free to 
betray my trust.  By telling her that I stole a car, I ran the risk that she 
would ultimately prove untrustworthy—that I was unwise to confide in her.  
Does the same analysis apply to Google?  Under a strict construction of the 
misplaced trust rule—which, for reasons explored above, is not only 
consistent with Katz but, in some sense, derived from Katz—the answer 
would certainly be “yes.”  Google is a private actor with whom I have 
voluntarily shared information; therefore, it is free to betray me.  Along 
these lines, consider how Patricia Bellia and Susan Freiwald analyze the 
issue in the course of arguing that Smith and Miller should not extend to 
stored email.  Although they argue that using an email storage client should 
not extinguish one’s expectation of privacy in the content of email outright, 
Bellia and Freiwald go on to conclude that 
if [an email provider] chooses to disclose the [content of a user’s email] to 
the government without requiring a warrant, the user cannot complain.  
When the user assumed the risk that the intermediary would discover 
incriminating information or property in the course of its business, she 
also assumed the risk that the intermediary would choose to turn that 
information over to the government.  If the user mistakenly trusted the 
intermediary to protect its incriminating information, there is no reason 
for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust.150 
 
 150. Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-
mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 167 (2008).  Resolving the question this way, Bellia and 
Freiwald made explicit what is, in other scholars’ accounts, only latent. See Tokson, supra 
note 11, at 585 n.26 (compiling sources to this effect).  In passing, it bears noting that Bellia 
and Freiwald’s account has an interesting wrinkle.  Analytically, the core proposition on 
which their view rests is the following:  when people use services run by “third party 
intermediaries,” they retain an expectation of privacy against the state, but they “lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to those third party intermediaries who 
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This analysis certainly scores points for candor.  But I want to suggest 
that it is both (1) normatively uncomfortable, and (2) in tension with the 
reasoning of Ferguson and Stoner.  First, the normative point is not difficult 
to see.  Under Bellia and Friewald’s analysis—which flows from Katz and 
tracks the misplaced trust rule—it would be constitutional for Google (or an 
entity like it) to archive and mine all user data, running sophisticated 
analytics designed to unearth criminal behavior, and to submit the results to 
law enforcement (which could then sustain search warrants).  Indeed, not 
only would this be constitutional; it would not even trigger constitutional 
scrutiny, because, under the misplaced trust rule, no Fourth Amendment 
search would have occurred.  Making matters worse, the hypothetical is not 
genuinely hypothetical.  Today, many intermediaries do assist law 
enforcement in ways like this.  The assistance most commonly takes the 
form of ferreting out child pornography,151 but there is little reason, in 
principle or in practice, to think that “data vigilantism” will remain 
circumscribed to that particular domain.152  Furthermore, even among 
intermediaries that have not taken up the law enforcement mantle 
voluntarily, virtually all seem to be facing pressure in that direction.153 
The bigger issue, however, is that the misplaced trust rule leaves Google 
(and other entities like it) free to use customer information this way despite 
the fact that, practically speaking, the information was never actually 
“entrusted” to Google in the manner the rule has in mind.  When a user 
shares information with Google—like when a patient shares information 
with a doctor or a guest shares information with a hotel manager—she is 
engaged in what I will call “arm’s length entrustment.”  Unlike, say, 
 
discover information in the course of exercising their rightful access to[,] [for example,] the 
users’ packages, storage lockers, rental properties, or stored e-mail accounts.” Bellia & 
Freiwald, supra, at 166.  Curiously, the only authority cited for this proposition are cases in 
which someone loses his expectation of privacy because the fiduciary relationship has 
expired, which would seem at least ambiguous—if not actively counterproductive—to their 
position. Id. at 166 n.184. 
 151. See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
AOL was not operating as an agent of law enforcement when it voluntarily monitored user 
email for the purpose of assisting with criminal investigation); United States v. Cameron, 
699 F.3d 621, 637–38 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding likewise with respect to Yahoo!); United 
States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 367 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding same as to AOL); see also 
Hoofnagle, supra note 3, at 600–07 (discussing the data technology available to mainstream 
companies today). 
 152. Perhaps the best—and most chilling—argument along these lines comes from 
fiction. See DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE (2013) (imagining a world in which a Google-like 
entity turns its sights toward, among other things, predictive analytics about criminal 
behavior). 
 153. For obvious reasons, this is difficult to quantify—the whole point of many of these 
programs is secrecy.  But if recent revelations about the ubiquity of national security letters 
and so forth are any indication, pressure from law enforcement is incredibly widespread. See, 
e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Warrant Canaries and Disclosure by Design:  The Real Threat to 
National Security Letter Gag Orders, 124 YALE L.J. F. 158 (2014).  To be clear, compliance 
with, for example, national security letters falls beyond the scope of my concern here 
because it is clearly instigated by law enforcement and, therefore, even under existing 
doctrine, not purely private action.  The point is simply that, given the reality of pressure 
today, it is easy to imagine a climate tomorrow in which cooperation is voluntary (rather 
than compliant), but the upshot for privacy is the same. 
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siblings, Google and its users have no preexisting trust relationship.  The 
reason a user shares information with Google has nothing to do with their 
relationship; rather, it is the precondition of using Gmail, just as sharing 
information with a doctor is the precondition of obtaining medical care, and 
sharing information with hotel staff is the precondition of renting a room.  
Furthermore, all three actors serve social functions that make sharing 
information with them practically involuntary.  If I need medical care, I 
have no choice but to consult a doctor.  If I need lodging, I have no choice 
but to find a hotel.  Likewise, with email, if I wish to participate fully in the 
digital world—an increasingly unavoidable decision given the realities of 
social and professional life—I must engage with Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs). 
This segues to the second difficulty with applying the misplaced trust 
rule to an entity like Google:  it runs directly into Ferguson and Stoner.  
Consider Bellia and Friewald’s final sentence—“[i]f [a] user mistakenly 
trusted the [ISP] to protect its incriminating information, there is no reason 
for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust”154—as a 
template.  On this logic, the proper analysis in Ferguson would have been 
as follows:  “[I]f [a pregnant woman] mistakenly trusted [her doctor] to 
protect [the] incriminating information [contained in her urine], there is no 
reason for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust.”  And 
similarly, in Stoner:  “[I]f [a hotel guest] mistakenly trusted [hotel 
employees] to protect incriminating information [in his room], there is no 
reason for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust.”  For the 
reasons explained at length in Part I, neither of these formulations is faithful 
to the logic of Ferguson and Stoner.  In both cases, the upshot was that the 
defendant did not run the risk of misplaced trust.  Rather, the third party’s 
decision to voluntarily assist law enforcement fell within the bounds of 
Fourth Amendment protection because the Court recognized that “trust,” in 
the everyday sense, was not present in these relationships at all.  Instead, 
sensitive information had been “entrusted” at arm’s length, and the decision 
to engage in arm’s length entrustment was, in a practical sense, 
involuntary.155 
Distinguishing between (1) the presence of genuine trust, and (2) the act 
of practically involuntary, arm’s length entrustment not only helps to draw 
out the commonalities among doctors, hotel staff, and ISPs, but it also helps 
to pinpoint exactly what went wrong in Smith and Miller.  Although these 
cases have inspired no shortage of vitriol, the foregoing analysis of arm’s 
length entrustment makes clear that commentators have actually been too 
forgiving of the cases’ common flaw.  If, as Ferguson and Stoner (and 
 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 150. 
 155. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Implicit in 
the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice.  At least in the third-party 
consensual surveillance cases, which first incorporated risk analysis into Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, the defendant presumably had exercised some discretion in deciding who should 
enjoy his confidential communications.  By contrast here, unless a person is prepared to 
forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help 
but accept the risk of surveillance.” (citations omitted)). 
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normative intuition) suggest, arm’s length entrustment generates more 
Fourth Amendment protection than disclosure to a genuinely trusted party, 
Smith and Miller are not just wrong but backward; they regard arm’s length 
entrustment—precisely because it is arm’s length—as deserving of less 
Fourth Amendment protection.  Therein lies the crucial error. 
This element of backwardness came explicitly to the fore in Smith.  In his 
opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun distinguished Smith from Katz on 
the grounds that people have much less reason to trust a phone company 
than they have to trust a person on the other line of a call.156  As Justice 
Blackman put it, “it is too much to believe that telephone 
subscribers . . . harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial 
will remain secret,”157 in implicit contrast to the expectation—codified in 
Katz—that telephone subscribers’ actual conversations will remain secret.  
Viewed in this light, Justice Blackmun’s logic is appealingly 
straightforward:  because phone companies are less trusted than listeners, 
disclosures to phone companies (dialed numbers) should carry a lesser 
expectation of privacy than disclosures to listeners on the other line.  In 
other words, there is a clear, linear relationship—according to Justice 
Blackmun—between trust and privacy protection. 
Many commentators find Justice Blackmun’s analysis in Smith 
unconvincing, to put it mildly.  I am among them.  But it is important to be 
precise about why Blackmun’s analysis fails.  The problem is not that 
Justice Blackmun (and the rest of the Court) hallucinated a distinction 
between sharing information with another person and sharing a dialed 
number with the phone company.  That distinction is a real one; I do have 
less reason, generally speaking, to trust my phone company than I have 
(again, generally speaking) to trust people to whom I elect to talk on the 
phone.  The problem is the next step in Justice Blackmun’s reasoning.  
From the observation that people trust phone companies less than they trust 
other human beings, Justice Blackmun drew the wrong inference.  In fact, 
he drew the diametrically wrong inference.  Our lack of trust in phone 
companies, far from eroding constitutional protection, should have 
increased it.  In short, what Justice Blackmun failed to appreciate—and 
what Ferguson and Stoner make clear—is that, for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, protection does not always correlate positively to trust.  At times, 
the correlation inverts, and relationships predicated on arm’s length 
entrustment of information carry greater protection than relationships 
predicated on genuine trust. 
 
 156. Id. at 743 (majority opinion). 
 157. Id.  For the reasons explored in Part I, Justice Blackmun could not have meant 
“remain secret” to mean “not disclosed to another party”—the whole point was that both 
pieces of information (the contents of the call and number dialed) had already been disclosed 
to another party.  Furthermore, the question was how to think about the significance of the 
disclosure. 
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III.  WHO ARE FOURTH AMENDMENT FIDUCIARIES? 
Ultimately, the claim is quite straightforward.  Under conditions of 
practically involuntary, arm’s length entrustment, one should be able to 
expect that shared information will be used only for limited purposes and 
certainly not to expose one to criminal liability.  Indeed, in areas of “private 
privacy” law—as opposed to constitutional privacy law—regulators have 
already begun to recognize the need for implied, fiduciary-style duties to 
govern arm’s length entrustment.158  The same is true, I will argue, for 
Fourth Amendment doctrine as well. 
Jack Balkin has fashioned a term—“information fiduciaries”—to 
describe the set of counterparties with whom we have relationships built on 
arm’s length entrustment.159  Although Balkin’s analysis has focused 
specifically on ISPs, the logic extends beyond that realm.160  In fact, it 
reaches all manner of counterparty to whom we entrust “personal [or] 
sensitive information” today, and who, because they occupy a status 
“analogous to . . . traditional . . . fiduciaries,”161 are obligated to use that 
information in ways that benefit us (or at least, that don’t work to our 
detriment).  Whereas traditional fiduciaries often manage financial assets, 
and their duties tend to concern financial transactions, information 
fiduciaries manage the “asset” of information, and their duties primarily 
concern security and confidentiality.  But putting to one side this difference 
in the content of duties owed by information fiduciaries as compared to 
traditional fiduciaries, their essential nature is the same.  The duties 
operate, in practice, to constrain information fiduciaries from pursuing their 
unbounded self-interest, when doing so would collide with the interests of 
beneficiaries—that is, with our interests.162 
To appreciate the force of Balkin’s claim, particularly in the somewhat 
idiosyncratic setting of Fourth Amendment law, an overview of fiduciary 
norms will be useful.  In general, fiduciary duties come in two forms:  care 
 
 158. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 638–42 (2014) (exploring how the FTC uses 
“unfairness” as a doctrinal mechanism for enforcing widespread expectations and 
substantive privacy norms, notwithstanding the explicit language of privacy policies); 
Margot Kaminski, Robots in the Home:  What Will We Have Agreed to?, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 
661, 674 (2015) (noting that unlike the Fourth Amendment setting, where courts tend to 
interpret voluntary sharing of information with a third party as a waiver of privacy interests, 
“in the private actor context, they may consider substantive privacy norms even where 
consent has technically been granted”); id. at 674–75 & nn.73–77. 
 159. Balkin, supra note 5. 
 160. See generally id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other 
Cultures:  Can a Transplant Take?, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 46, 55 
(Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) (“The keystone . . . legal obligation [is] that the fiduciary use 
her powers not for her own benefit but for the exclusive benefit of her beneficiary.”); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY LAW § 387 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (explaining that 
a fiduciary is obligated “to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected 
with his agency”). 
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and loyalty.163  A duty of care is an obligation, in essence, to exercise 
diligence when making decisions on behalf of a beneficiary.164  A duty of 
loyalty, by contrast, is an obligation to resolve conflicts of interest in favor 
of the beneficiary.165  These two obligations are conceptually harmonious 
but also, in important respects, distinct.  For example, suppose that A 
manages money for B—a role that carries both a duty of care and duty of 
loyalty.  Pursuant to her duty of care, A has an obligation to ensure that 
investments are not riskier than B desires.  To do so, A must be attuned to 
B’s appetite for risk (which, in practice, will likely be set by contract), and 
she must exercise diligence when reviewing possible investments.  Pursuant 
to her duty of loyalty, on the other hand, A has an obligation to refrain from 
making investments on B’s behalf simply because A stands to benefit from 
those investments.  For example, suppose that A, in addition to being a 
money manager, also owns Company X.  If Company X is trying to attract a 
new round of funding, A may not pledge B’s assets—to which A only has 
access because of their fiduciary relationship—to help capitalize Company 
X.  Doing so would subordinate B’s interests, which A is supposed to be 
safeguarding, to A’s own interests.  It would be a form of “self-dealing.”166 
Ultimately, both duties respond to the same underlying problem.  
Fiduciaries, by virtue of their status, have access to the resources of their 
beneficiaries—a position naturally ripe for abuse, rendering informal 
mechanisms of accountability insufficient to ensure good behavior.167  
 
 163. There is some variance across legal settings, but all formulations seem to 
conceptually come back to care and loyalty. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary 
Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1262 (2008) (explaining that 
corporate fiduciary duties “fall into two broad categories:  the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
care”); Ethan Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. L. REV. 665, 675 (2009) (describing 
care and loyalty as the “two central fiduciary duties”). 
 164. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:  Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047–49 (1991) 
(explaining that the duty of care is not merely a nonharm principle—unlike the duty of 
loyalty, it sometimes requires affirmative action on the fiduciary’s part); Elizabeth S. Scott 
& Robert E. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2420–21 (1995) (outlining 
the contours of the duty of care). 
 165. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 163, at 1263 (sketching the contours of the duty 
of loyalty in broad strokes); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 164, at 1045–55 (examining the 
scope of the duty of loyalty, and explaining when and why fiduciaries are permitted to 
engage in self-regarding behavior).  Naturally, however, the duty of loyalty does not 
eliminate the room for self-serving behavior outright. See, e.g., Eileen Scallen, Promises 
Broken Vs. Promises Betrayed:  Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 
U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 908 (“[C]lassic fiduciary relationships are by no means divorced from 
self-serving considerations.”). 
 166. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 164, at 1054–55 (outlining the general 
prohibition on self-dealing, and explaining the limited circumstances in which fiduciaries are 
permitted to engage in it). 
 167. See Leib, supra note 163, at 683 (explaining that fiduciaries “ha[ve] easy access to 
important resources of [their] beneficiar[ies],” and that the purpose of fiduciary duties is to 
“deter misuse” of those resources); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of 
Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (“[F]iduciary relationships form when 
one party (the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising 
discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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Fiduciary relationships also tend to be “especially difficult to monitor,” 
making them particularly “susceptible to abuse.”168  And this, in turn, is 
why contract remedies are not enough, standing alone, to vindicate the 
normative purpose of fiduciary duties.  The point of enforcing fiduciary 
duties is not only to make injured parties whole ex post, but it is also to 
deter “opportunism” and encourage “bonding” in ways that “facilitate a 
beneficiary’s reliance on the trustworthiness of her fiduciary.”169  Put 
simply, legal structures are necessary to ensure that fiduciaries refrain from 
exploiting the considerable power that flows from their status vis-à-vis 
beneficiaries. 
These rationales map straightforwardly onto the actors discussed so far in 
this Article.  Not only are ISPs, for example, privy to large amounts of 
sensitive information, but monitoring what they do with that information is 
also difficult and costly, especially in the context of metadata and other 
“noncontent” information, which users often do not even realize they are 
transmitting.170  This is not to say, of course, that users couldn’t be made to 
shoulder the costs of monitoring.  They certainly could.  There is no reason, 
in principle, why service providers currently bound by fiduciary 
obligations—trustees, for example, or money managers—couldn’t be 
bound, instead, exclusively by contractual obligations.171  But that 
possibility misses the normative point.  The whole purpose of imposing 
duties of care and loyalty on (traditional) fiduciaries is that market forces—
as reflected in the outcomes of bargaining—do not lead, on their own, to a 
desirable allocation of cost and risk.172 
 
 168. Leib, supra note 163, at 683. 
 169. Id. at 683–84; see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 824–25 
(1983) (explaining that a key doctrinal feature of fiduciary law is burden-shifting:  
beneficiaries are “entitle[d] . . . to rely on the fiduciary’s trustworthiness,” meaning that in 
the event of a lawsuit, a beneficiary “is . . . not required to show that he actually relied on the 
fiduciary,” but rather “the fiduciary has the burden of justifying self-dealing transactions”). 
 170. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting 
that, in the context of cell site data, “it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that 
their cell phone providers collect and store historical location information”). 
 171. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 
36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (“Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no 
moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, 
as other contractual undertakings.”); John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of 
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) (describing fiduciary obligations as “unambiguously 
contractarian” in nature). But see Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of 
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 (1988) (concluding that in spite of the 
“elusive nature” of fiduciary duties, “descriptions drawn exclusively from contract principles 
are surely mistaken”); Scott Fitzgibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 
MARQ. L. REV. 303, 341–43 (1999) (exploring the shortcomings of the “contractualist” 
approach to fiduciary duties). 
 172. See, e.g., Fitzgibbon, supra note 171, at 341 (exploring the ways in which “fiduciary 
affiliations serve different purposes than those known to [market-based] utilitarianism”); 
Selbst, supra note 103, at 681 (noting that there is a tendency in debates about privacy to 
conflate “the descriptive claim that the market [could] solve the problem” with “the 
normative claim that it should [do so]”); see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 
158 (2007) (explaining why the “privacy market” tends not to operate efficiently—among 
other reasons, because “[w]e rarely have any real ‘relationship’ with the third-party entities 
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In other words, even if beneficiaries are theoretically capable of 
shouldering the costs necessary to monitor fiduciaries, the point is that they 
should not have to.  Beneficiaries should be able to rely on the sturdiness of 
background legal rules designed to safeguard their interests; this is what 
enables beneficiaries to act as though they trust fiduciaries, even though, in 
the absence of legal rules, such “trust” would be unwarranted.  This sort of 
“virtual trust” serves a variety of functions.  Perhaps most importantly, it 
facilitates candid interaction, which, in the context of something like 
medical care or legal assistance, can be paramount to successful outcomes 
and, in the context of digital correspondence, allows social life to proceed 
organically, without constant fear of disruption.  In short, fiduciary duties 
relieve us of the burden of determining who, among a particular class of 
counterparties, is actually trustworthy; in doing so, they help preserve the 
integrity of social life.173 
There are, to be sure, some conceptual difficulties that arise in trying to 
import fiduciary principles to the Fourth Amendment setting.  But those 
difficulties are no greater than—and indeed, they ultimately reflect—the 
internal tensions of fiduciary law.  As Ethan Leib has shown, many, if not 
all, of the justifications behind traditional fiduciary duties apply just as 
readily (perhaps even more readily) to intimate relationships.  Although we 
are accustomed to thinking about fiduciary duties in the context of arm’s 
length transactions, there is no reason in principle why the same logic—
justifying the use of state power to enforce implied obligations—should not 
apply, for example, to promises made by friends.  For Leib, then, the proper 
doctrinal test for assessing duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality would 
be functional, not formal, in nature.  It would ask whether a given 
relationship “trade[s] upon high levels of trust and leave[s] one party in a 
position of domination, inferiority, or vulnerability.”174  If so, that 
relationship should enjoy special solicitude.175  Indeed, in certain domains, 
the doctrine already takes this sort of functionalist approach to fiduciary-
style obligations—for example, when it ascribes implied duties of 
confidentiality to parties that hold themselves out as promising to keep 
sensitive information in confidence176 or implied duties of loyalty to parties 
that maintain an ongoing course of dealing.177 
 
that acquire our information, possess virtually no bargaining power over them, are often 
ignorant of or confused about the third party’s privacy ‘offer,’ and in any event frequently 
have no way to opt out of or fine-tune the ‘contract’”); Anderson, supra note 114, at 13–14 
(explaining the “preposterous[]” way that “law treats our acquiescence [to form contracts] as 
if we had bargained with the entity and reached a mutually agreeable solution”). 
 173. See supra note 132. 
 174. Leib, supra note 163, at 672. 
 175. See id. at 700–20 (especially pages 707–10). 
 176. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763, 
777–80 (2014) (documenting the salience of (1) underlying trust between the parties, and (2) 
social custom in the jurisprudence of implied confidentiality). 
 177. See 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 11 (2009) (“A partnership arises from express or implied 
agreement among parties . . . .”).  For an example of what this standard means in practice, 
see Chenault v. Jamison, 578 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Ala. 1991) (explaining that, if one party to 
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Leib’s insight is an important one.  And the problem he highlights—a 
problem for the law of fiduciary duties writ large—is particularly 
pronounced in the Fourth Amendment context.  After all, many of the 
variables that counsel in favor of treating doctors, hotel staff, or ISPs as 
information fiduciaries also counsel in favor of treating friends, family 
members, and other intimates the same way.  By way of explaining why my 
doctor occupies a fiduciary status, for example, I might invoke the 
experience (which most of us undoubtedly share) that when I entrust 
sensitive information to a doctor, I do not expect that she will betray me.  I 
feel as though I am telling my doctor something in confidence.  But of 
course the same is likely to hold true when I tell my friend, sibling, spouse, 
or colleague something sensitive.  Indeed, it will be the rare case of 
disclosure—to any counterparty—when I expect the person to disseminate 
the relevant information to others behind my back. 
Yet there would be something seriously wrong with a Fourth 
Amendment rule that disallowed, for example, supervisors or coworkers 
from reporting illegal activity at work.  And there would be something even 
more seriously wrong with a rule that stopped coconspirators from deciding 
to withdraw from inchoate criminal activity178 or that prohibited friends and 
family members, for example, from cooperating with law enforcement in 
circumstances where they felt impelled—for reasons of conscience or out of 
concern for their own safety—to do so. 
Adopting rules like this—rules that effectively extend Fourth 
Amendment protection to all voluntary cooperation with law 
enforcement—would devastate the criminal justice system.  Defendants 
would always be able to assert an interest in, and potentially forestall or 
suppress, the (incriminating) testimony of other parties.  All evidence 
procured from common areas—homes, cars, offices, computers, and so 
on—would arouse Fourth Amendment scrutiny.179  Consider the 
 
a putative partnership is “led to believe . . . that [the other party] intended to be a partner,” 
that can be sufficient for the partnership to form). 
 178. See United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to apply 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny to a bookkeeper’s decision to testify for the prosecution on the 
grounds, inter alia, that the bookkeeper should be free to “protect[] herself” from 
prosecution).  This commitment is also reflected in, among other places, the “withdrawal” 
defense in conspiracy law—which allows a coconspirator to escape liability if he can show 
that he took material steps to withdraw from the effort before the commission of the 
offense—and the “coconspirator” exception to the rule against hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2)(E) (a statement is not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party 
and . . . was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy”); 
see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1330–31 (2003) 
(explaining that the legal system’s facilitation of betrayal among coconspirators originated in 
common law immunity doctrine and was designed to ensure that “so long as the . . . witness 
made a good faith effort to assist the prosecution he would go free”); id. at 1331–32 
(explaining, in a similar vein, that “the law of contracts . . . rightly refuses to enforce 
agreements that prevent conspirators from defecting”). 
 179. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States v. Bowers, 594 
F.3d 522, 525–27 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that it was a purely private search when 
defendant’s roommate and her boyfriend entered defendant’s room, removed a photo album, 
and gave it to the police).  Naturally, many fact patterns that involve searches by roommates, 
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implications of such a world!  Uncertainty would loom over every 
investigation.  The history of virtually all evidence introduced against a 
given defendant would be cast into doubt and amenable (theoretically, at 
least) to a Fourth Amendment challenge.  Criminal investigations would 
grind to a halt.  In short, there are good reasons to leave private actors free, 
in general, to betray one another to law enforcement on pragmatic grounds 
certainly, but even on normative grounds.  People in possession of 
incriminating information about others should have autonomy to use the 
information as they see fit.180 
The notion of “counterparty autonomy” is important here because it 
circles back to the issue of practically involuntary, arm’s length entrustment 
discussed above.  What distinguishes Fourth Amendment fiduciaries (to 
whom the misplaced trust rule does not apply) from everyday 
counterparties (to whom it does) is not expectations of confidence; it is 
relative power.  When it comes to doctors, hotel staff, and ISPs—to name 
but a few examples of counterparties that fall into the fiduciary category—
the decision to share information, though not formally mandatory, is 
practically inescapable.  As such, the same anxieties about “opportunism” 
and “suscepti[bility] [to] abuse” that define traditional fiduciary 
relationships apply in this setting as well.181  If anything, they apply even 
more urgently, given the severe consequences that can flow from law 
enforcement investigation (whether or not one is ultimately convicted).  In 
light of these concerns, the answer, just as in traditional fiduciary 
relationships, is to limit the autonomy of certain parties to direct the flow of 
information—to law enforcement, in particular—as they see fit. 
Beyond shoring up the distinction between Fourth Amendment 
fiduciaries and other counterparties, the emphasis on counterparty 
autonomy also serves another important goal:  it helps explain the origin, in 
the first instance, of the misplaced trust rule in Fourth Amendment law.  
Although the principle has long been a fixture of doctrine (hence the 
discussion in Part I), its rationale has gone oddly unelaborated.  Indeed, it 
would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the “expectations of privacy” 
framework, standing alone, provides no rationale for the misplaced trust 
rule.  Normally, when A shares information with B, A does not expect—and 
sometimes, A precisely does not expect—that the information will travel 
further.182  Yet the Fourth Amendment allows B (at least as a default rule) 
 
spouses, and houseguests never even rise to the level of Fourth Amendment scrutiny because 
they are so clearly outside the bounds of constitutional protection. 
 180. See supra note 112 (discussing Supreme Court language to this effect); see also 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 39 (explaining that, as a matter of presumption, “an 
individual”—that is, a counterparty—“has an autonomy and free speech interest in choosing 
to share information that will often trump any privacy interest” on the part of the sharing 
party). 
 181. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
 182. Sherry Colb has documented this issue eloquently and at greater length. See Colb, 
supra note 11, at 127–44 (documenting the fallacy that runs through much of the Supreme 
Court case law of “equating risk [with] invitation”).  Indeed, not only does A, when 
disclosing information to B, not typically expect that disclosures will travel further than B, 
but there are also likely to be likely to be circumstances in which the opposite inference is 
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to transmit the information as B sees fit, notwithstanding A’s expectations.  
Why?  Counterparty autonomy supplies a full answer to this question.  
Generally speaking, B should be able to cooperate with law enforcement 
because B has an interest in doing so.  Unless B has a specific obligation not 
to transmit A’s information—that is, unless B is an information fiduciary—
B should be able to direct the flow of information in her possession.183 
At last, then, the big question is, which counterparties are Fourth 
Amendment fiduciaries?  So far, the Article has offered three examples:  
doctors, hotel staff, and ISPs that facilitate digital correspondence.  Who 
else belongs in the category?  First, following Chris Slobogin and others, I 
would draw a categorical line—at least for the purpose of establishing 
default rules—between individuals and institutions.184  When it comes to 
individuals, autonomy over information—the ability to dispose of 
information as one pleases—is central to “personhood.”185  In Slobogin’s 
words, “the autonomy interest of a putative witness trumps the privacy 
interest of a . . . target [of investigation],” because “no person should be 
able to prevent another from providing information to the government.”186  
Crucially, however, “that analysis”—emphasizing the relationship between 
informational autonomy and personhood—“makes sense only when the 
third party is a person,” not an institution.187  Why?  Because “[a] bank, 
 
more plausible—that A, by disclosing information exclusively to B, expected the disclosure 
to limit the ultimate flow of information.  Suppose, for example, that A has committed 
adultery and his wife is starting to get suspicious.  A tells his best friend, B, about the 
adultery and asks for B’s help in brainstorming a way to ensure that their other friends—and 
most especially, A’s wife—don’t find out.  Under circumstances like this, it would be 
ludicrous to conclude that because A confided in B, A can no longer expect that his adultery 
will stay under wraps:  that is precisely what A expects. 
 183. A similar point can be made about the private search doctrine.  One reason we might 
protect B’s ability to investigate A—and, if desired, to relay the results of the investigation to 
law enforcement—is that B has an interest in doing so.  In fact, the private search doctrine is 
almost impossible to rationalize on expectation of privacy grounds.  Who expects that a 
package sent via FedEx will be dismantled by an employee (purposefully or not) and its 
contents brought to the attention of law enforcement?  Who expects that his computer will be 
hacked—itself an illegal act—by an anonymous vigilante keen on unearthing child 
pornography?  Under an “expectations of privacy” metric, these holdings are scandalous.  
But reconceived in terms of counterparty autonomy, they make sense (whether they are 
rightly decided is quite another matter). 
 184. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 172, at 157–60; Bryan H. Choi, For Whom the Data Tolls, 
37 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576948 
[http://perma.cc/6SK7-FVRR]; Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1643 (1987) (arguing that 
people have “an autonomy-based right to choose to cooperate with the authorities”); see also 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 39 (distinguishing, in broad strokes, between the 
autonomy interests of persons and the attenuated autonomy interests of “[i]nstitutional third 
parties”). 
 185. SLOBOGIN, supra note 172, at 159; see also Coombs, supra note 184, at 1642–44 
(identifying personhood as the normative rationale for “betrayal” in Fourth Amendment 
law). 
 186. SLOBOGIN, supra note 172, at 159. 
 187. Id. (emphasis added). 
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hospital, or ISP is not denied ‘personhood’ when its ability to turn 
information over to the government is restricted.”188 
Of course, to say that institutions, generally speaking, have no autonomy 
interest in the information entrusted to them does not mean (1) that only 
institutions are in this position, or (2) that institutions never have an 
interest—of a normatively relevant sort—in cooperating with law 
enforcement.  Neither proposition is true.  To begin with, it is certainly not 
the case that all information fiduciaries are institutions.  Many flesh-and-
blood individuals—with whom we transact at arm’s length, usually for 
particular services—play that role as well.  Whether they do so depends on 
the nature of the particular relationship, but the familiar criteria govern.  
Doctors, lawyers, repairmen, financial advisors—all of these actors (and 
this is certainly not an exhaustive list) are information fiduciaries to the 
extent that we entrust information to them for reasons that have nothing to 
do with “trust,” in the everyday sense.  Rather, we entrust information to 
these counterparties because doing so has instrumental value—in spite of, 
not because of, the fact that we have no basis to assume they will safeguard 
our information.  For the reasons discussed above, there are good reasons to 
conclude that practically involuntary, arm’s length entrustment carries an 
implicit limitation on use:  specifically, an implied covenant to avoid using 
sensitive information in ways that harm the sharing party. 
Moreover, even if institutions—and individuals that play a fiduciary 
role—lack an autonomy interest in sharing information with law 
enforcement, it does not follow that they have no interest in sharing 
information with law enforcement.  Interests take many forms.  It seems 
uncontroversial, for example, that companies should be able to share 
information with law enforcement (even companies that otherwise operate 
as information fiduciaries) if they reasonably fear that adverse 
consequences will flow from not doing so. 
For example, if a company can show that the persistence of a customer’s 
(or a user’s) criminal activity poses a risk of legal liability for the company, 
it should be able to cooperate with law enforcement.  For instance, a case 
like Stoner would presumably be different—and I think it should be 
different—if the hotel room in question were being used to operate a 
criminal enterprise, rather than storing nonhazardous contraband.189  Under 
those circumstances, the hotel manager might able to convincingly argue 
that the criminal enterprise was exposing the hotel to potential liability, in 
which case cooperation with law enforcement would certainly be warranted.  
The Fourth Amendment does not require businesses to subordinate their 
own legal standing to the privacy interests of their customers.190  The same 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1963) (holding that a homeowner 
relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy when he used his home to run an illegal 
venture).  Presumably, what is true of expectations of privacy in one’s home would also be 
true, a fortiori, of expectations of privacy in one’s hotel room. 
 190. Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (holding that it does not 
violate a defendant’s self-incrimination rights for the government to subpoena records from 
the defendant’s accountant, because, among other reasons, an accountant’s “own need for 
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reasoning also applies to economic concerns.  If a company can show that a 
customer’s (or a user’s) criminal activity poses a detrimental risk to 
business, this, too, might justify cooperation with law enforcement—though 
probably subject to a more stringent evidentiary burden than claims of 
imminent criminal or civil liability.191 
By the same token, it does not qualify as an objectively reasonable 
concern about adverse legal or economic consequences for an institution (or 
individual) to claim an overarching interest in “aiding . . . in the 
apprehension of criminals.”192  That interest is shared by everyone, equally, 
whether or not they operate in a fiduciary capacity.  At some level, in fact, 
the public’s general interest in “aiding . . . the apprehension of criminals” is 
indistinguishable from the autonomy interest that nonfiduciaries have in 
disposing of information as they see fit.  One of the reasons we safeguard 
the ability of private actors to betray one another—apart from the practical 
mayhem that the opposite rule would create—is that individuals, as 
members of the public, have an interest in seeing wrongdoing redressed.193  
The same is not true of information fiduciaries.  Crucially, this is not 
because it is impossible (or even unlikely) that information fiduciaries wish 
to see wrongdoing redressed.  It is because information fiduciaries are not 
empowered to act on that wish.  Surely there are many doctors—and hotel 
managers, and ISPs, and so forth—who, when left to their own devices, 
would very much prefer to cooperate with law enforcement.  The point is 
that their preferences are not the salient variable.  Our privacy is.194 
 
self-protection [against criminal prosecution] . . . often require[s] the right to disclose the 
information given him”). 
 191. Something of this has already surfaced in the doctrine—though in an under-
theorized way—when courts ask if private searches were motivated by legitimate business 
interests. See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
a search, to be private, must serve a purpose “entirely independent of the . . . collect[ion] [of] 
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution” (quoting United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 
418 (6th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that private searches are only private if their purpose is related to business activity, not “to 
elicit a benefit for the government in either its investigative or administrative capacities”).  
Doctrinally, the standard is fuzzy partly because of its sheer logical indeterminacy.  Courts 
have not been clear as to whether the absence of a legitimate business condemns a search, or, 
instead, whether the presence of a legitimate business interest justifies a search (or something 
in between).  In any event, it seems safe to conclude that courts should look on claims of 
“business interests” with some degree of skepticism, given how easy it is to speculate about 
economic loss. 
 192. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 (2006) (quoting Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971)). 
 193. Though in particular cases, of course, there may well be other considerations, such 
as personal safety, that contribute to an individual’s autonomy interest.  This concern is front 
and center in the cotenancy cases. Compare id. at 121–22 (holding that if both cotenants are 
present, and one invokes his Fourth Amendment rights, that invocation trumps the other’s 
consent), with Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134–35 (2014) (holding that the 
consent of a cotenant sufficed to justify a search after the other tenant (1) had invoked his 
Randolph rights, but (2) had been removed from the premises).  With respect to the latter, in 
particular, Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court includes numerous rhetorical flourishes about 
the importance of leaving law enforcement free to aid victims of domestic violence. 
 194. Under the framework set forth here (with its emphasis on the institution-individual 
divide), the hardest cases are likely to be those that involve agents of information 
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CONCLUSION 
In the digital age, reforming Fourth Amendment law requires more than 
just pruning back an isolated site of doctrinal overgrowth from the late 
1970s—overgrowth so extreme that even its enthusiasts do not seem to take 
Smith and Miller at face value.195  How could they?  The notion that people 
“[have] no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties”196 runs directly into Katz, and the conceptual 
edifice devised to explain this tension away—the distinction between 
“content” and “noncontent” information—has been exposed as a house of 
cards.  Jurisprudentially, Jones and Riley portend the end of the so-called 
“third-party doctrine.”  And conceptually, the doctrine has been something 
of a mirage all along. 
Good riddance—for there are larger monsters to slay.  Data is quickly 
becoming the main currency of law enforcement, and in a world of 
substantial—and growing—intermediation, our data is less and less our 
own.  To keep clip with these developments, Fourth Amendment law must 
begin to think differently about collaboration between law enforcement and 
 
fiduciaries—like employees—who, as individuals, do not have fiduciary obligations to the 
sharing party, but who nonetheless operate under the auspices of a fiduciary bond.  Hotel 
managers and doctors pose few, if any, difficulties in this respect, because these actors, 
despite being individuals, do have independent fiduciary obligations to primary parties.  The 
same considerations that would make it troubling for a hospital to maintain a blanket policy 
of cooperating with law enforcement also make it troubling for a doctor to cooperate with 
law enforcement in a less systematic way (and likewise, the same considerations that make it 
troubling for a hotel, as an institution, to betray guest information to law enforcement also 
make it troubling for a hotel manager to do the same). 
  But consider the following hypothetical.  B, a Google engineer, is performing run-of-
the-mill maintenance when he notices strange traffic patterns through A’s Gmail account.  
His curiosity piqued, B decides to investigate—and lo and behold, A has been transmitting 
child pornography.  Under the fiduciary model, Google’s cooperation with law enforcement 
certainly triggers (some degree of) Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  But what about B’s 
cooperation with law enforcement?  There are three possible answers.  First, B’s cooperation 
might always trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny—because B-the-individual is, in effect, an 
extension of Google-the-institution.  Second, B’s cooperation might never trigger Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny—if we think about B as an individual with autonomy interests intact.  
Third, B’s cooperation might sometimes trigger Fourth Amendment protections, depending 
on whether B was acting in a formal or informal capacity, on Google’s behalf or not. 
  Normatively, this last answer is probably the most attractive (as middle positions 
often are), but its doctrinal plausibility remains to be seen. See United States v. Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. 109, 126 (1984) (holding that no Fourth Amendment scrutiny is triggered by a 
FedEx worker’s decision to search the contents of a package broken while in transit and to 
turn discovered contraband over to law enforcement).  The “Google engineer” hypothetical 
provides an exact analogy to Jacobsen in the digital age.  Without purporting to resolve the 
puzzle here, suffice it to note that the result in Jacobsen may well have come out 
differently—and it almost certainly would have been analyzed differently—if the “private 
search” had been pursuant to a FedEx-wide policy to scan and, if necessary, dismantle all 
packages that flow through the FedEx system. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Vigilantes and 
Good Samaritans, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2657789 [http://perma.cc/G7SE-BAY5]. 
 195. See supra note 28. 
 196. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(summarizing the third-party doctrine, as traditionally understood); Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
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the private sector.  Traditionally, the rule has been that sharing information, 
no matter with whom, invites the danger of misplaced trust.  But looking 
forward, that rule no longer makes normative sense.  Nor, looking 
backward, has the rule given rise to consistent application.  When the chips 
are down, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the misplaced trust rule 
to settings where it clashes with social reality.  Digital communication is the 
most recent—and in today’s world, the most practically pressing—example 
of such a setting. 
The point of this Article is ultimately quite simple.  In settings where 
private actors operate as information fiduciaries, law enforcement should 
not have carte blanche to demand their cooperation; nor should private 
actors that serve as information fiduciaries be free—without bound—to 
assist law enforcement voluntarily.  Today, we live alongside sprawling 
organizations whose purpose, and profit, is fundamentally tied to their use 
of information.  Our information.  Doctrine must adapt to this reality.  It 
must learn to distinguish between sharing at arm’s length—which occurs as 
the precondition of obtaining a socially valuable service—and sharing with 
counterparties who are genuinely trusted and whose involvement thereby 
gives rise to a risk of misplaced trust.  This distinction, like so many that 
law confronts in the face of technological change, is at once conceptually 
lucid and doctrinally precarious.  Is Fourth Amendment law up to the task?  
Let us hope so.  The future of constitutional privacy depends on it. 
